Weighing Society\u27s Need for Effective Law Enforcement against an Individual\u27s Right to Liberty: Swinney v. State and the Forth-Eight Hour Rule by Goldberg, Mark J.
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 1 Vol. 24 Iss 1 Article 7 
2005 
Weighing Society's Need for Effective Law Enforcement against 
an Individual's Right to Liberty: Swinney v. State and the Forth-
Eight Hour Rule 
Mark J. Goldberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 73 (2004-2005) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
WEIGHING SociETY's NEED FOR EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO LIBERTY:
Swinney v. State AND THE FORTY-EIGHT HOUR RULE
MarkJ. Goldberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 2002, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Swinney v. State,1
held that a forty-three hour delay between an individual's arrest and initial
appearance before a judicial officer was reasonable.2 This determination led the
court to reject Vickie Swinney's ("Swinney") argument that the forty-three hour
delay was unconstitutional and resulted in Swinney's conviction for capital mur-
der and aggravated assault being upheld.' The United States Supreme Court's
decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,4 was used to resolve the issue of
reasonableness in Swinney's delayed initial appearance.5 The McLaughlin opin-
ion provided that a Fourth Amendment violation could occur if an individual
was detained after a warrantless arrest for an unreasonable amount of time with-
out a judicial determination of probable cause to support the arrest.6 McLaughlin
was an attempt by the Supreme Court to clarify Gerstein v. Pugh,7 in which the
term "prompt" was used to define when judicial determinations of probable
cause must be held after warrantless arrests to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.8
One issue raised by the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling in Swinney is
whether McLaughlin's holding was misapplied since an example of an unreason-
able delay provided in McLaughlin,9 was substantially analogous to the justifica-
tion for law enforcement's delay of Swinney's initial appearance." Another
issue presented by the Swinney decision is whether incriminating statements
made by Swinney should have been suppressed if the delay between her arrest
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Mississippi College School of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Patricia Bennett for her guidance and supervision in the selection and drafting of this Note.
1. 829 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 2002).
2. See id. at 1232.
3. Id. at 1228. Swinney had argued that the delay resulted in the deprivation of her right to counsel pro-
vided by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article Three, Section Twenty-Six of the
Mississippi Constitution. Id. at 1230. Consequently, she sought to have her statements made to law enforce-
ment before her initial appearance, without an attorney, suppressed. Id.
4. 500U.S.44(1991).
5. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1231-32 (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-57).
6. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55-57 (providing a time limit in which judicial determinations of proba-
ble cause within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest would be presumptively reasonable while those occur-
ring after the passage of forty-eight hours would only be found to not violate a suspect's rights if the govern-
ment could prove an actual emergency or exigent circumstance for the delay).
7. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
8. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 47 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103).
9. See id. at 56 (stipulating that an individual's rights may be violated if a probable cause determination
is held within forty-eight hours of arrest but still delayed for the goal of amassing additional evidence to sup-
port the arrest).
10. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232 (agreeing with the circuit judge's opinion in which the delay for
Swinney's initial appearance, for the purpose of determining whether Swinney could be charged with an addi-
tional crime, was reasonable).
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and initial appearance was found to be unreasonable.11 Furthermore, should the
Mississippi Supreme Court have even used McLaughlin to resolve the initial
appearance issue in Swinney, since the facts of the opinion did not expressly
indicate whether Swinney was arrested pursuant to a warrant? If Swinney was
arrested pursuant to a warrant, McLaughlin's holding, requiring judicial determi-
nations of probable cause, could not have been violated since arrest warrants rep-
resent such findings.12
This Note will seek to analyze and resolve the above mentioned issues pre-
sented by Swinney. Also, the history and origin of Gerstein/McLaughlin Fourth
Amendment violations will be traced through United States Supreme Court
precedent. Furthermore, how various courts such as the Supreme Court, United
States Courts of Appeals, and Mississippi Supreme Court have applied the
Gerstein/McLaughlin analysis will be examined.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts Leading to Arrest and Trial
Swinney, along with her brother Nicholas Swinney ("Nicholas"), entered a
pawn shop at 2:15 p.m. on the day of November 17, 1997.13 At the time, the
shop's owner, Don Harville ("Harville"), as well as two customers were present
in the store." After approximately twenty minutes the two customers left the
store leaving Nicholas and Swinney alone with Harville.' Swinney then let
Harville inspect two of her rings and when Harville went to weigh the jewelry,
Swinney produced a gun and shot him in the back. 6 Subsequently, another cus-
tomer, William Morrison ("Morrison"), came into the store and found Harville
lying on the floor. 7 Morrison then attempted to call 911 from inside the store,
but after hearing a gunshot, he ran towards the front entrance and was struck
from behind by gunfire. 8
At trial there was conflicting testimony as to what occurred after Morrison
fell outside of the doorway. 9 Morrison testified that he observed Swinney pull
out a pistol from a car after she ran out of the pawnshop and saw that he was still
11. The Fourth Amendment requires judicial determinations of probable cause before prolonged deten-
tion of individuals, Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, and the Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained through
violations of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
12. Cf United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant's
arraignment was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours; but, since the defendant was arrested through the use of
a warrant, McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding was inapplicable); Lawrence v. State, 869 So. 2d 353,
356 (Miss. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation under Gerstein/McLaughlin since an arrest warrant
was served the day after an arrest, representing a judicial finding of probable cause).
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moving.2" However, Scott and Teresa Crum, two witnesses observing the events
occurring outside the shop, testified that a thin black man had the gun and not
Swinney.1' One of the first customers in the store had identified Swinney as the
shorter sibling, and Nicholas as the taller of the two.22 Nicholas and Swinney
were subsequently arrested at a police roadblock that same afternoon, and a 9-
millimeter handgun was found in their car while two 9-millimeter bullets were
found in Swinney's pocket after she was taken to jail. 3
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on the day of the robbery and arrest, November
17, 1997, Swinney was questioned by Billy Clyde Burns, a Captain in the
Corinth Police Department. 4 At this initial questioning Swinney stated that her
brother Nicholas had the gun, and at no time did she fire the weapon.2"
However, on November 19, 1997, at approximately 9:00 a.m. Swinney provided
a conflicting statement in response to questioning by Ralph Dance, a district
attorney's office investigator. 6 Swinney subsequently claimed that she acciden-
tally shot Harville in the back in an attempt to unjam her gun, which she pulled
out after Harville had turned to weigh her rings.2 This statement was not record-
ed and Swinney would not sign the statement after Investigator Dance had writ-
ten it down. 8 Also, this second statement provided the only direct evidence that
Swinney had shot Harville in the back. 9
B. Trial Court Procedure
In the Circuit Court of Alcorn County Swinney was convicted for the capital
murder of Harville and the aggravated assault of Morrison." Swinney was "sen-
tenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole," for the murder of
Harville and to twenty years in prison for Morrison's aggravated assault with
both sentences to run consecutively.3 In a preliminary proceeding Swinney filed
a motion to suppress her statements made to Investigator Dance, which had
implicated her in Harville's death. 2 Swinney claimed the statements were inad-
missible because, they resulted from an unreasonable delay between her arrest
and initial appearance before a judge, they were obtained through a violation of




23. Id. at 1229-30.





29. Id. at 1232.
30. Id. at 1228.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1229.
33. Id.
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While rejecting Swinney's claim of coercion without making any findings of
fact, the circuit judge also denied the motion to suppress on Swinney's unreason-
able delay argument due to her being afforded an initial appearance within forty-
eight hours of arrest," in compliance with Mississippi's Initial Appearance Rule
6.03. s The jury's guilty verdict was entered by the circuit court on December
10, 1998, and Swinney's motion for a new trial or alternatively, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, was denied on December 15, 1998.38
C. Swinney I
Swinney's appeal was first decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court on
March 1, 2001."7 The main argument in Swinney's appeal was that her initial
appearance before a judge was unreasonably delayed and this lead to incriminat-
ing statements being taken from her, which violated her right to counsel."
Swinney claimed the delay was unnecessary and in violation of Rule 6.03,"
because law enforcement was ready, and a circuit court judge was available for
her arraignment on November 18.40 Therefore, when the district attorney's
office requested the arraignment be postponed until November 19, for the pur-
pose of investigation, an unreasonable delay occurred.4' Consequently, the state-
ments made to law enforcement on the morning of November 19, after the unrea-
sonable delay and before her initial appearance, were taken in violation of
Swinney's federal and state right to counsel and should have been suppressed. 2
In deciding this issue the court relied upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in McLaughlin and Rule 6.03, which together required an
arrested person to have an initial appearance within forty-eight hours of arrest,
and without unnecessary delay. The court further defined "'without unneces-
sary delay' to mean 'as soon as custody, booking, administrative and security
needs have been met."' 44 Moreover, the court noted once the administrative
34. Id.
35. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03 ("Every person in custody shall be taken, without unnecessary
delay and within 48 hours of arrest, before a judicial officer... [and] if the arrest has been made without a war-
rant, the judicial officer shall determine whether there was probable cause for the arrest...... and if the judicial
officer does not find probable cause to support the warrantless arrest, the accused must be released.). Rule 6.03
replaced Rule 1.04 on May 1, 1995, which did not contain a specific forty-eight hour requirement, but instead
required an initial appearance "without unnecessary delay[;]" and, Rule 6.03 was designed to reflect the United
States Supreme Court's forty-eight requirement provided in McLaughlin. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1231.
36. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1229.
37. Swinney v. State, No. 1999-KA-00031-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. Mar. 1, 2001), withdrawn
and substituted by, 829 So. 2d 1225.
38. Id. at **1-2. Swinney also claimed that the trial court erred by not admitting exculpatory portions of
her statements to police, while admitting the incriminating portions. Id. at **19-20. Furthermore, she alleged
the trial court erred in not providing a circumstantial evidence instruction as to the robbery charge, id. at *24,
and in not directing a verdict as to the robbery due to a lack of evidence. Id. at **22-23.
39. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03 (see supra note 35).
40. Swinney, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at **8,12.
41. See id. at *8.
42. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 6).
43. See id. at **9, 11.
44. Id. at *11 (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 644 (Miss. 1997) (citing Abram v. State, 606 So.
2d 1015 (Miss. 1992))).
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needs of law enforcement had been met, the only excusable reason for delay
would be the unavailability of a judge to conduct an initial appearance." The
court also provided that an initial appearance may be unconstitutional when held
within forty-eight hours of arrest if a defendant could prove the appearance was
delayed either for an illegal purpose," or for a purpose unrelated to the adminis-
trative needs of law enforcement. "7
From applying the facts of Swinney's arrest, detention, and questioning to
the above mentioned legal requirements the court found Swinney's initial
appearance to be unnecessarily delayed. 8 In doing so the court rejected the trial
judge's conclusion that delay for the purpose of investigating what crimes to
charge an arrestee with was permissible.49 To allow delays for this purpose
would give law enforcement too much latitude and allow them to take statements
from detainees, determine the truthfulness of those statements through investiga-
tion, and subsequently confront those accused with any inconsistencies in their
statements, while delaying an initial appearance which provides an accused with
counsel."0 In Swinney's case, her second round of questioning occurred after her
initial appearance was postponed from November 18, to November 19.
Investigator Dance testified that the purpose of this questioning was to confront
Swinney with discrepancies between her initial statements and evidence found
through further investigation. 2 Therefore, Swinney's initial appearance before a
judicial officer was delayed for an impermissible purpose.5 3
The result of this finding was that Swinney was entitled to counsel when she
made incriminating statements to Investigator Dance on November 19, 1997,
before her initial appearance, because the right to counsel adheres at the time the
initial appearance should have been held.' However, since Swinney gave a vol-
untary and knowing waiver of her right to counsel before making incriminating
statements, her confession was admissible.55 Based on this holding and the rejec-
tion of Swinney's other arguments on appeal the court affirmed Swinney's con-
viction for capital murder and aggravated assault.5 6 On motion for rehearing,
45. Id. (citing Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1029).
46. Id. at ** 11-12 ("such as 'gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill
will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake."') (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)).
47. Id. at *12 (citing Evans, 725 So. 2d at 644).





53. Id. at *14.
54. Id. (citing Jimpson v. State, 532 So. 2d 985, 988 (Miss. 1988) (quoting May v. State, 524 So. 2d 957,
967 (Miss. 1988))).
55. Id. at *25.
56. Id. at **25-26. The Court also held that the trial judge's decision to not admit the exculpatory por-
tions of Swinney's statements given to authorities, while admitting the incriminating portions, was erroneous;
but, the error was harmless since Swinney failed to prove that the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Id.
at *22. Also, there was no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant Swinney a directed verdict per the rob-
bery count, or in the refusal to administer a circumstantial evidence instruction to the jury because there was
sufficient direct evidence to support the robbery conviction. See id. at **22-25.
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October 31, 2002, the court again affirmed Swinney's conviction for capital
murder and aggravated assault, but subsequently found the delay between
Swinney's arrest and initial appearance to be reasonable. 7
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
Since the Mississippi Supreme Court in Swinney relied upon McLaughlin to
resolve the issue of unreasonable delay, 8 United States Supreme Court precedent
leading to and including McLaughlin will be examined. Also, how the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted and applied McLaughlin's
holding will be discussed. Furthermore, Mississippi Supreme Court opinions
involving McLaughlin claims will be analyzed. In addition, decisions addressing
violations of Mississippi's Initial Appearance Rule 6.03," that influenced the
Swinney court will be provided.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Gerstein v. Pugh
The issues before the United States Supreme Court in Gerstein were whether
an individual could be arrested and detained until trial without a judicial finding
of probable cause and if not, whether the judicial finding of probable cause had
to be in the form of an adversarial hearing to satisfy the Constitution." The
Court resolved these issues through a Fourth Amendment analysis and held that
prompt judicial determinations of probable cause were a prerequisite to pro-
longed detention, but the determinations did not have to reach the level of an
adversarial hearing.61 However, the Court did not specifically define "prompt,"
which lead to the issue before the Court in McLaughlin.2
Pugh and Henderson were both arrested and detained in Dade County,
Florida, in March 1971 63 Neither was released before trial, Pugh because of the
severity of his crime and Henderson because he could not afford bail, and both
were formally charged by prosecutorial information approximately two weeks
after their initial arrest.' Therefore, both men were detained for a significant
period of time without a judicial determination of probable cause.6"
Subsequently, Pugh and Henderson brought a class action in United States
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Dade County seeking injunctive
and declarative relief in the form of a determination of probable cause.66
57. Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1228, 1232 (Miss. 2002).
58. Seeid. at 1231.
59. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03.
60. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
61. Seeid. at 126.
62. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991).
63. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105.
64. Id. at 105, 105 n. 1. Also, there was no indication that either man was arrested pursuant to a warrant.
Id. at 105 n.1.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 106-07, 107 nn.5-6. Furthermore, neither detainee sought release from their pretrial confine-
ment. Id. at 107 n.6.
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The district court "held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments [gave]
all arrested persons charged by information a right to a judicial hearing on the
question of probable cause." 7 Dade County was then ordered to give Henderson
and Pugh a preliminary hearing so that probable cause could be determined in
order to support their further confinement. 8 Also, the district court ordered
Dade County to provide a plan in which all cases brought by information would
require preliminary hearings.69 However, on appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the order; and, when the Florida Supreme
Court changed the rules controlling preliminary hearings statewide, the case was
remanded so that the district court could determine whether the new statewide
procedures were constitutional." Ultimately the district court held, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, that the new procedures were unconstitutional since an individ-
ual could still be charged by information and detained without a judicial finding
of probable cause.7 1
On certiorari, the Supreme Court first determined whether judicial findings
of probable cause were constitutionally required for extended pretrial detention.72
In doing so, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment and common-law prece-
dent were the bases for procedural standards pertaining to arrests and deten-
tions.73 Also, the Court explained that arrests must be supported by probable
cause, 74 which symbolized a proper balance between a person's right to freedom
and the government's duty to limit crime. 7' Furthermore, in order to ensure the
Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures,
neutral magistrates were required to make findings of probable cause whenever
possible.7 6 However, since law enforcement would be too severely burdened by
a per se requirement of judicial determinations of probable cause before all
arrests, the Court noted warrantless arrests backed by probable cause should not
be invalidated.77
67. Id. at 107.
68. Id. at 107-08.
69. Id. at 108 (The adopted plan required arrested individuals to be brought before a judicial officer upon
arrest for a hearing in which probable cause would be determined, charges against the accused would be
explained, the accused would be read his rights, and appointed counsel if indigent.).
70. See id. at 109. The new rules provided by the Florida Supreme Court required all arrested individuals
to be afforded a first appearance before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest; but, did not require a
probable cause determination to be made at this appearance. Id. (citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130(b)). Also, those
charged by indictment or information would not be provided any preliminary hearings. Id. (citing FLA. R.
CPJM. P. 3.131; In re Rule 3.131(b), 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974)).
71. See id. at 109-10 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973), affd, 483 F.2d 778
(5th Cir. 1973)).
72. See id. at I10-11.
73. Id. at 111 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807);
Exparte Burford, 7 U.S. 448 (1806)).
74. Id. at 111-12 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
75. Id. at 112.
76. See id. at 112-13 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20-22 (1968)).
77. See id. at 113 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)).
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From weighing society's need for effective law enforcement against individ-
uals' needs for liberty, and applying the preceding legal principles, the Court
determined that a law enforcement officer's finding of probable cause would be
sufficient to justify a brief detention of a person in order to take the administra-
tive steps necessary to an arrest. 8 Nevertheless, the Court also held that a judi-
cial finding of probable cause was required by the Fourth Amendment for
extended periods of detention following arrest. 9 Several historical sources were
then cited by the Court to support its Fourth Amendment holding and to show
how the common law required arrested individuals to be brought before judges
promptly after arrest.8"
After finding that judicial determinations of probable cause were required by
the Fourth Amendment, the Court rejected the Florida State Attorney's argument
that prosecutorial determinations of probable cause were sufficient to detain an
individual until trial.81 The Court then approvingly cited the legal principle in
which illegal arrests or detentions would not negate subsequent convictions.82
Finally, the Court turned to the issue of whether judicial findings of probable
cause had to be in the form of adversarial proceedings.'
In finding that adversarial safeguards were not necessary in judicial determi-
nations of probable cause to justify pretrial detention the Court noted how the
probable cause standard for arrest was the same as the standard for pretrial
detention.' Consequently, since an informal, nonadversarial proceeding before
a magistrate was most often used for the issuance of arrest warrants, the same
type of proceeding would suffice for pretrial detentions.8" The addition of cer-
tain procedural safeguards, such as cross-examination, might improve the accu-
racy of probable cause findings in certain cases; however, in the vast majority of
cases the costs to the criminal justice system would outweigh the benefits of
78. See id. at 113-14.
79. See id. at 114 (reasoning that once an individual is arrested and detained the reasons to dispense with
judicial determinations of probable cause become nonexistent (danger of a suspect committing other crimes
while a warrant is sought), while the need to have independent findings of probable cause increase (the eco-
nomic and social burdens pretrial confinement can have on an individual)).
80. Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); Kurtz v. Moffit, 115 U.S. 487, 498-99
(1885); 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 116-17
(4th ed. 1762)).
81. See id. at 116-19, 117 n.19 (citing Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927) (invalidating an
arrest warrant based upon an information provided by a United States Attorney); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (providing that a detached and neutral magistrate's constitutional role was not
compatible with a prosecutor's relationship with law enforcement); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345
(1972) ("[P]robable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be determined by someone independent of
police and prosecution."); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); but cf Ex
parte United States 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932) (noting that a grand jury indictment is a proper determination of
probable cause and would support the issuance of a warrant for a suspect's arrest)).
82. Id. at 119 (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)). This
statement may be considered dictum since neither Pugh nor Henderson sought release from custody or a rever-
sal of convictions, but only injunctive relief in the form of probable cause determinations. See id. at 107 n.6.
Also, neither Frisbie, nor Ker, involved allegations of Fourth Amendment violations.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 120.
85. See id.
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adding trial-like procedures to Fourth Amendment findings of probable cause.86
Also, probable cause determinations are not critical stages in a prosecution that
would require the appointment of counsel because of their limited function and
nonadversarial character.87
The Court then explained that individual states should determine the specific
timing and nature of probable cause hearings to support pretrial detention in
order to allow for experimentation and flexibility in their varied systems of crim-
inal justice.88 However, to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, a
state "must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a con-
dition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must
be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest."8 The
Supreme Court's lack of specificity in designating a timing requirement for
probable cause determinations in Gerstein, lead the Court to address that exact
issue sixteen years later in McLaughlin.
B. The Forty-Eight Hour Requirement: County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of what specific amount of time could be considered "prompt," and there-
fore satisfy the Court's Fourth Amendment holding in Gerstein."0 This issue
required resolution due to a split in the circuit courts, with the Fourth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits requiring judicial findings of probable cause immediately
after administrative measures following arrest;8 ' and, the Second Circuit inter-
preting Gerstein to allow for flexibility in the timing of probable cause determi-
nations.92 Ultimately, the Court held that a judicial finding of probable cause
made within forty-eight hours of a person's arrest would generally satisfy
Gerstein and the Fourth Amendment. 3
Donald Lee McLaughlin ("McLaughlin"), brought an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, in August 1987 against the County of Riverside, California ("County"),
challenging the legality of the County's procedure for providing probable cause
determinations to those subjected to warrantless arrests. 4 At the time, the
County's policy was to provide arraignments in which probable cause determi-
nations were made for those subjected to warrantless arrests, without undue
delay and within forty-eight hours of arrest. 5 However, this forty-eight hour
86. See id. at 122, 122 n.23 (explaining that adding adversarial procedures to all judicial determinations
of probable cause resulting in pretrial detention would increase, rather than lessen, pretrial delays).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 123.
89. Id. at 124-25.
90. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991).
91. Id. at 50 (citing Fisher v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1139-41 (4th Cir. 1982);
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1567-68 (7th Cir. 1985); McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d
1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989)).
92. Id. (citing Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988)).
93. See id. at 56.
94. Id. at 47-48.
95. Id. at 47.
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requirement did not count holidays and weekends." Therefore, delays ranging
from five to seven days were possible.97 McLaughlin was incarcerated in the
county jail when his complaint was filed, which alleged that he had not been
provided with a determination of probable cause.9" Consequently, McLaughlin
requested declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring the
County to provide prompt bail, arraignment, and probable cause hearings to
those arrested and detained without warrants.99
The United States District Court for the Central District of California certi-
fied the suit as a class action in November 1988, for every present and future
arrestee in the county jail."' Then, the district court found that the County's
arrest and detention procedures violated the Supreme Court's Gerstein deci-
sion."' Consequently, the County had to provide determinations of probable
cause inside of thirty-six hours of an arrest, unless exigent circumstances exist-
ed."5 2 After consolidating McLaughlin's class action with an identical proceed-
ing involving San Bernardino County, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's holding that the County's practice of
providing probable cause findings within forty-eight hours of arrest violated
Gerstein."3 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to clarify Gerstein's
"promptness" requirement regarding probable cause determinations.' "
Initially, the Court rejected the County's argument that the plaintiffs lacked
standing."0 Then, the Court explained how Gerstein was an attempt to balance
the competing interests that states have in providing public safety by detaining
persons suspected of engaging in criminal activity, with private citizens' inter-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 48.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 49, 50 (citing McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989) (provid-
ing that a forty-eight hour requirement conflicted with Gerstein's promptness stipulation because only thirty-
six hours were necessary to carry out the administrative steps following an arrest), vacated, 500 U.S. 44).
104. Id. at 50.
105. See id. at 50-52. Regarding the named plaintiffs, the County argued that standing did not exist
because too much time had passed for them to receive a prompt hearing and under City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the plaintiffs could not show the likelihood of being subjected to unconstitutional
conduct in the future. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 50-51. The Court rejected the County's Lyons argument and
distinguished the case by noting that in Lyons the constitutional violation had ceased before the complaint was
filed; but, in the principle case, the plaintiffs were in custody and had not received probable cause determina-
tions when their complaint was filed. See id. at 5 1. Thus, injunctive relief was an appropriate remedy for the
plaintiffs' injuries. Id. The Court also noted that even though the named plaintiffs' claims had been rendered
moot, through their release or grant of probable cause determinations, the action was still reviewable due to the
presence of unnamed class members. Id. at 51-52 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n.l I (1975)
(citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975))); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n.3 (1984)). Furthermore,
the Court had jurisdiction although class certification occurred after the named plaintiffs' cases were moot
because of the inherently transitory nature of the claims, id. at 52 (citing United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980) (citing Gerstein, 4200 U.S. at 110 n.1 1))), which allowed for the "relation
back doctrine" to save the merits of the controversy for judicial review. Id. (citing Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S.
204, 213-14 n.11 (1978); Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402 n. 11).
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ests in not being detained on unfounded reasons for prolonged periods of time."'
Also, the Court described Gerstein as requiring prompt judicial determinations
of probable cause, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, but at the same time
allowing individual states to provide these determinations in different manners
so as to give deference to federalism." 7 Subsequently, the Court reasoned that
Gerstein's emphasis on flexibility and experimentation could not lead to a
Fourth Amendment holding in which probable cause determinations had to be
made immediately after the administrative steps following an arrest."8 Instead,
the practical realities of such matters as paperwork delays, bail determinations,
and increased arrests on weekends, needed to be taken into account when pre-
scribing a specific time limit beyond which a Fourth Amendment violation
would occur."0 9
In order to provide the states with a bright-line timing requirement, while at
the same time taking into account Gerstein's countervailing interests of flexibili-
ty and the need to give warrantless arrestees timely findings of probable cause,
the Court held that such findings within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest
would generally satisfy Gerstein's promptness requirement.110 However, even if
a probable cause determination was provided within forty-eight hours, a consti-
tutional violation could occur if the determination was unreasonably delayed."
When this type of delay occurs the arrested individual must prove unreasonable-
ness. 12 Conversely, when a determination of probable cause is not made within
forty-eight hours of arrest the State has the burden of justifying the delay with an
exigent or emergency circumstance. 3 In addition, intervening weekends and
procedural hindrances would not be considered extraordinary circumstances. 4
Before applying this ruling to the County's procedures for arrest and deten-
tion the majority criticized Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, specifically the
portion in which he argued twenty-four hours would be a more appropriate time
limit than forty-eight hours. "' The majority noted a shorter timing requirement
would not be constitutionally compelled and would be an unfunded mandate,
interfering with states' control over their local criminal justice systems.1 '
Ultimately, the Court held that the County's policy for providing judicial deter-
minations of probable cause was potentially unconstitutional because weekends
and holidays were excluded from the computation of time between arrest and
106. See id. at 52-53 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103).
107. See id. at 53 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103).
108. Id. at 53-54. The Court explained how requiring judicial determinations of probable cause immedi-
ately after the administrative steps subsequent to arrest, a holding advanced by the Ninth Circuit and the dis-
senters in the principal case, was contrary to Gerstein's emphasis on experimentation and flexibility. Id. at 54.
Furthermore, the Court characterized Justice Scalia's use of the common law to support an immediate finding
of probable cause in his dissenting opinion as reliance on a "vague admonition." Id. at 54-55.
109. See id. at 55.
110. See id. at 55-56.
111. Id. at 56 ("Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to
justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake.").
112. See id.
113. Id. at 56-57.
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 57-58.
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probable cause determination, resulting in delays exceeding forty-eight hours."1 '
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's thirty-six hour holding was vacated and the case
was remanded in order for the lower courts to determine if there were legitimate
reasons for the County's delays. "8
However, in dissent to the majority opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, argued that Gerstein's promptness requirement
could only be met if a probable cause determination was made immediately after
the administrative steps following arrest." 9 Justice Scalia, writing separately,
also dissented from the majority opinion and would have found a Fourth
Amendment violation if, following a warrantless arrest, a probable cause deter-
mination was delayed for a purpose not related to the procedural requirements of
law enforcement, or if twenty-four hours passed between arrest and probable
cause determination. 2 Justice Scalia based his holding on the traditional com-
mon law protection in which persons arrested without warrants had to be deliv-
ered to magistrates as soon as reasonably possible. 21 Consequently, he rejected
the majority's use of a balancing approach to resolve the Fourth Amendment
issue since this common law principle existed in 1791 and had been carried for-
ward to modem times.'22 Moreover, Justice Scalia's selection of twenty-four
hours as being an adequate quantity of time for providing probable cause deter-
minations and completing arrest procedures, was based on numerous opinions
by courts, commentators, and commissions.123
Although the majority resolved the issue of what constituted a "prompt"
determination of probable cause in McLaughlin,'24 other questions arising from
unreasonable delays were left unresolved. For example, would a confession
obtained after a delayed probable cause determination be admitted into evidence
or be deemed inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule? Also, should the
McLaughlin holding be applied retroactively to every case not final at the time
117. Id. at 58-59.
118. Seeid.at59.
119. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia would also employ the burden shifting method provided
by the majority, with the arrestee having to prove unreasonableness before twenty-four hours passed, but the
State having to prove the existence of an unforeseeable circumstance to justify delays occurring past twenty-
four hours. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 60-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95 n.13 (1st Am. ed.
1847); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 289, 293; Wright v. Court, 107 Eng. Rep. 1182 (K.B. 1825); 1 R.
BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 267-77 (1837)).
122. See id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also did not accept the majority's findings that
Gerstein required flexibility and experimentation in the timing of probable cause determinations. See id. at 65
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, Scalia believed the Court in Gerstein was referring to the nature of the proba-
ble cause determination, whether it should be adversarial or allow for testimony, when calling for experimenta-
tion and flexibility. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 68-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Justice Scalia did not believe
that persons subjected to warrantless arrests should even have to wait for the administrative steps following
arrest to be completed before receiving a probable cause determination if a magistrate was available to hold a
hearing. Id. at 66 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that an individual should not be subjected to pho-
tographing or fingerprinting when a probable cause determination affecting the arrestee's freedom of move-
ment could be made).
124. Id. at 56.
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the ruling was announced? In Powell v. Nevada,2 ' both of these issues were dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court, but only the latter was decided.'26
C. Powell v. Nevada
Kitrich Powell ("Powell") was held in police custody for four days without a
probable cause determination after being arrested for the felony abuse of a
child.'27 On the fourth day in custody a Magistrate found probable cause to hold
Powell, and on that same day Powell made incriminating statements to police
that were used against him at trial.'28 By the time of Powell's preliminary hear-
ing the child had died from her injuries and Powell was subsequently found
guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.'2 9 Before the Nevada
Supreme Court Powell contended that his conviction should be reversed since
the failure to bring him in front of a judge within seventy-two hours of arrest
violated Nevada's initial appearance law. 3 Although the Nevada Supreme
Court upheld Powell's conviction because he waived his right to a prompt
appearance within seventy-two hours of arrest, the court went on to declare
Nevada's seventy-two hour initial appearance statute unconstitutional since it
exceeded McLaughlin's forty-eight hour Fourth Amendment holding. 3 ' Further,
the court held that this did not affect Powell's conviction since he was arrested
before the McLaughlin holding, in which the Supreme Court declared a new rule
that was not required to be applied retroactively.'32
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed
the Nevada Supreme Court's decision to not apply McLaughlin to Powell's
case."' Relying on Griffith v. Kentucky, 3" the Court held that McLaughlin's
forty-eight hour rule was to be applied in all cases, federal or state, not yet final-
ized when the rule was declared.'35 Since Powell was held well in excess of
forty-eight hours before receiving a judicial determination of probable cause and
his case was not final at the time McLaughlin was decided, the Nevada Supreme
Court's retroactivity decision was incorrect. 3 However, as to the consequences
of McLaughlin applying to Powell's case, such as whether or not his conviction
should be reversed, the Supreme Court left for the Nevada Supreme Court to
determine on remand.
37
125. 511 U.S. 79 (1994).
126. See id. at 80, 84-85.




131. Id. at 82-83.
132. Id. at 83.
133. Id.
134. 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
135. See Powell, 511 U.S. at 84-85.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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Conversely, Justice Thomas, with Chief Justice Rehnquist joining in dissent,
would have decided the remedy issue and held that Powell's incriminating state-
ments could be used as evidence despite the delay in excess of forty-eight hours
of Powell's probable cause determination." First, Justice Thomas argued that
certiorari should not have been granted since the Nevada Supreme Court's deci-
sion was obviously erroneous, given Griffith's retroactivity rule which had
caused little or no conflict among the circuit courts. '39 Then, the dissent
addressed the appropriate remedy issue since remanding would have required the
needless consumption of judicial time on a meritless claim.14 ° While assuming,
for the sake of argument, McLaughlin violations should lead to the suppression
of evidence, Justice Thomas did not believe suppression was appropriate in
Powell's case since his confession was not the fruit of an illegal seizure. 4 Only
if a Magistrate had found Powell's arrest to be unsupported by probable cause
within forty-eight hours of detention would Powell's statement be causally con-
nected to the timing of his probable cause determination.'4 2
On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of
whether a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation required the suppression of evi-
dence.143 The court noted that the exclusionary rule should only be applied to
Fourth Amendment violations when the purposes for which the rule was created
would be served by the exclusion.'" Consequently, exclusion of all confessions
obtained through unlawful detentions would not be constitutionally required. 4
Therefore, the admission of a confession obtained through an unlawful detention
would be determined through voluntariness and related factors such as the exis-
tence of intervening circumstances.'46 The court went on to hold that although
the district court failed to make any determination as to the voluntariness of
Powell's statements, the admission of the statements at trial was harmless error
and therefore, Powell's conviction was upheld.'47
D. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Application of Gerstein/McLaughlin
with Emphasis on the Fifth Circuit
Gerstein/McLaughlin violations usually come before courts in two different
instances. One, in civil actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when individu-
138. See id. at 85, 91-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 86-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 89 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 90 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also analogized Powell's case to a previous Court
decision in which a suspect's incriminating statement was deemed admissible even though the statement was
obtained after a warrantless arrest, although the arrest was later found to be supported by probable cause. Id. at
91 n.I (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990)). Although the majority did
not attempt to resolve the suppression issue, Justice Ginsburg did distinguish Harris from the facts of Powell's
case in response to Justice Thomas's dissent. Id. at 85 n.*. Furthermore, the majority noted that "[a] court's
postsearch validation of probable cause will not render... [illegally obtained] evidence admissible." Id. (citing
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 34 (1970)).
143. Powell v. State, 930 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Nev. 1997).
144. See id. at 1125 (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)).
145. Id. at 1126.
146. Id. (quoting Arterburn v. State, 901 P.2d 668,671 (1995) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306 (1984)).
147. See id. (explaining that Powell's statements made during the unlawful detention were the same as
those he made immediately after his arrest).
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als seek monetary or injunctive relief against law enforcement individuals or
agencies. Two, in criminal actions where a defendant is seeking the exclusion of
evidence allegedly obtained through an unreasonable delay of a probable cause
determination after a warrantless arrest. The United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals have provided varying decisions regarding these two situations.
Therefore, the courts' substantive decisions will be provided with emphasis on
Fifth Circuit opinions. The Fifth Circuit's holdings will be focused upon since
the court's territorial boundaries include Mississippi; and consequently, the
Mississippi Supreme Court may be influenced by the circuit's decisions.
1. Circuit Court Opinions
Federal circuit courts have addressed Gerstein/McLaughlin violations in
criminal and civil appeals with varying results. For example, in an appeal from
a criminal conviction the First Circuit found a fifty-one hour delay of a judicial
determination of probable cause to be justified by extraordinary circum-
stances.148 Also, in United States v. Forde,149 the First Circuit refused to exclude
evidence obtained from an arrestee who had not received a judicial finding of
probable cause within forty-eight hours of being detained."' 0 Further, the Second
Circuit has chosen not to apply McLaughlin's forty-eight hour requirement to
border detentions of suspected alimentary canal drug smugglers."' In addition,
regarding a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Third Circuit
found Pennsylvania's arrest and pretrial procedures, which required judicial
determinations of probable cause within forty-eight hours of arrest, to be in
accordance with the Fourth Amendment as applied in Gerstein/McLaughlin.
152
Moreover, in United States v. Van Metre,15 3 the Fourth Circuit rejected a defen-
dant's claim that his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to a
McLaughlin violation."
148. See United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2002) (providing that the existence of more
than 100 detainees arrested during a military exercise on an island near Puerto Rico justified a minor delay past
forty-eight hours).
149. No. 93-1322, 30 F.3d 127, 1994 WL 390143 (1st Cir. June 30, 1994) (unpublished table decision).
150. See id. at *3 (noting that a Fourth Amendment violation did occur, but the evidence was obtained
before any unlawful detention and therefore the violation could not retroactively void the prior legal search)
(citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)); accord United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587,
591 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting suppression as an appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation when the evi-
dence was obtained before the violation occurred).
151. See United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1991) (distinguishing border detentions from arrests
which do require judicial approval) (citing United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)); cf
Mitarontonda v. Gazzola, No. 98-7604, 172 F.3d 38, 1999 WL 39013, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 1999) (unpublished
table decision) (holding that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity since detaining a suspect overnight
before presentment to a judicial officer for a probable cause determination was in accordance with McLaughlin's
forty-eight hour requirement). But see United States v. Onyema, 766 F. Supp. 76, 82-83, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (dis-
trict court within the Second Circuit suppressing evidence obtained through a seventy-eight hour delay, which the
court found to violate the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by Gerstein/McLaughlin).
152. See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 223, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2001).
153. 150 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 1998).
154. See id. at 347-48 (noting that the defendant's arraignment was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours;
but, since the defendant was arrested through the use of a warrant McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding
was inapplicable).
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However, in a 2003 opinion the Sixth Circuit found local law enforcement
officers, as defendants in a § 1983 action, to not be entitled to qualified immuni-
ty when an arrestee's probable cause determination was delayed for approxi-
mately seventy-two hours."' 5 The Seventh Circuit has provided conflicting opin-
ions regarding whether delays within forty-eight hours of arrest, for the purpose
of further investigation, constitute McLaughlin violations. '56 Also, a district
court within the Seventh Circuit has deemed suppression of evidence as the
appropriate remedy for such violations in criminal cases." 7 Comparatively, the
Eight Circuit has found a delay as short as two hours to constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation because the delay was for the purpose of investigating
other crimes.'58 On the specific issue of whether suppression of evidence is an
appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation the Ninth Circuit has held that
evidence should be excluded if it comes from the fruit of a poisonous tree. 9 In
the context of civil actions, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have both refused to
find law enforcement officials liable for McLaughlin violations when plaintiffs
155. See Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 642-44 (6th Cir. 2003) (refusing to deem the existence of
an ongoing undercover investigation or the fact that the arrest occurred over a holiday weekend, as extraordi-
nary circumstances that would justify the seventy-two hour delay); cf Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 814 (6th
Cir. 2003) (providing that a material factual dispute existed regarding whether a § 1983 plaintiff was arrested
pursuant to a warrant, but if a warrantless arrest occurred a Fourth Amendment violation existed since the indi-
vidual's probable cause determination was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours).
156. Compare United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 810, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no
McLaughlin violation when a suspect's judicial probable cause determination was held within forty hours of
arrest, but delayed for the purpose of investigating other, separate crimes not related to the initial arrest), and
United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a forty-hour delay of a probable cause
finding for the purpose of investigating the crime the suspect was arrested for did not fall into McLaughlin's
prohibition against delays for the purpose of gathering evidence to justify an arrest), with Willis v. City of
Chicago, 999 F.2d 284, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling that a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation occurred when an
arrestee was detained for forty-five hours before receiving a probable cause hearing, which the City claimed
was delayed for the purpose of investigating crimes unrelated to the individual's arrest). Also, in Willis the
court noted McLaughlin would clearly be violated if a suspect's probable cause hearing was delayed "for the
purpose of gathering evidence to justify the arrest." Willis, 999 F.2d at 288 (citing County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)).
157. See United States v. Leal, 876 F. Supp. 190, 191, 194-95 (C.D. Il. 1995) (holding that suppression of
a detainee's statement was the appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation, when the statement was
obtained during a seventy-two hour delay between arrest and probable cause determination); see also Kyle v.
Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining how the suppression of statements obtained during
delays in providing probable cause determinations was the usual remedy for Gerstein/McLaughlin violations in
criminal cases). The court's statement on suppression in Kyle could easily be characterized as dictum since the
case was a civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the plaintiffwas seeking damages, and not the sup-
pression of evidence. See Kyle, 196 F.3d at 697.
158. See United States v. Davis, 174 F.3d 941, 943-44, 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (relying on the principle that
delays motivated by the intent to uncover evidence to support an arrest or to investigate other crimes are unrea-
sonable) (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Willis, 999 F.2d at 288-89). As a result of the Fourth Amendment
violation the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision to suppress statements made by the accused,
while at the same time choosing not to deem suppression as the presumptive remedy for a Gerstein/
McLaughlin violation since the government had not argued the issue before the district court. See id. at 946
n.8, 948.
159. See Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1070, 1071-72, (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the poisonous
tree test as prescribed by Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963), but finding the arrestee's statements to be untainted by the McLaughlin violation and
made of free will); cf Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1480-82 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding local
law enforcement officials liable in a § 1983 action brought by a plaintiff whose probable cause hearing was
delayed in excess of forty-eight hours in violation of Gerstein/McLaughlin).
2005] WEIGHING SOCIETY'S NEED FOR EFFECTIVE LA W ENFORCEMENTAGAINSTAN 89
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO LIBERTY: SWINNEY V. STATE AND THE FORTY-EIGHT HOUR RULE
could not show how arresting officers were individually responsible for judicial
determinations of probable cause being delayed in excess of forty-eight hours. 6
2. Fifth Circuit Decisions
White v. Taylor,'6' is the earliest Fifth Circuit decision involving a McLaughlin
claim, and as of the time this Note was written, the only case appealed from a
United States District Court within Mississippi involving an alleged McLaughlin
violation. The issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether qualified immunity
should have been granted to a police chief who was purported to have violated
James White's ("White") rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.162 White initially
brought the action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, against the City of Morton, a Morton police officer, and Morton's
police chief, after he was arrested and held overnight in the Morton jail without
a probable cause determination from a neutral magistrate."' White alleged that
the detention violated his rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and a jury
verdict was returned in his favor in the amount of $1.00 in nominal damages and
$25,000 in punitive damages against the police chief.
64
On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict and held that the police
chief should have been granted qualified immunity since the right White was
claiming to be violated was not clearly established at the time of his arrest and
detention.' 6' At the time of his arrest in 1987, White's Fourth Amendment claim
was governed by Gerstein's promptness requirement and not McLaughlin's
forty-eight hour burden shifting rule.1 66 Noting how the Supreme Court in
McLaughlin described the Gerstein promptness requirement as "vague,"' 67 the
Fifth Circuit ruled a reasonable officer would not have known holding White
overnight without a probable cause determination violated the Fourth
Amendment.'6 8 In dissent, Chief Judge Politz argued that the jury's verdict
should not be overturned since there was an intentional violation of Mississippi
160. See Strepka v. Miller, 28 Fed. Appx. 823, 828 (10th Cir. 2001); Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 563
(11 th Cir. 1991); cf Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (holding that an eighteen hour
delay between an individual being arrested and being released (by being dropped off near his residence), was
not an unreasonable seizure and was in compliance with McLaughlin's forty-eight hour requirement). Even if
the plaintiffs release was delayed beyond forty-eight hours in Rodriguez a McLaughlin Fourth Amendment
violation would not have occurred since Rodriguez was arrested pursuant to a warrant. See Rodriguez, 294
F.3d at 1277; cf United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant's
arraignment was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours; but, since the defendant was arrested through the use of
a warrant McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding was inapplicable); Lawrence v. State, 869 So. 2d 353, 356
(Miss. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation under Gerstein/McLaughlin since an arrest warrant was
served the day after an arrest, representing a judicial finding of probable cause).
161. 959 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1992).
162. Id. at 540.
163. Id. at 540-41.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 546.
166. See id.
167. See id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)).
168. See id.
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law designed to safeguard constitutional rights.169 Also, in rejecting the majori-
ty's holding Chief Judge Politz explained Gerstein should not be used to autho-
rize the arrest and subsequent detention of "individuals who merely 'mouth
off. "'170
The Fifth Circuit has also reviewed alleged McLaughlin violations in the con-
text of criminal appeals from persons convicted of smuggling drugs across the
United States/Mexican border.17 ' In Perez-Bustamante, the issue before the
court was whether an individual's confession should be suppressed since that
person was detained for sixty hours before making a confession, and further held
in custody for two more days before being taken in front of a magistrate.'72
Rafeal Perez-Bustamante ("Perez") claimed 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) rendered his
confession inadmissible since his admission was obtained in excess of six hours
following arrest, and the delay in bringing him before a magistrate was not
caused by transportation delays. 7 Also, Perez argued that his five-day deten-
tion without a probable cause determination violated the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted by McLaughlin."4 In rejecting these claims the Fifth Circuit noted
that the purpose of McLaughlin, in further clarifying Gerstein, was to ensure that
states provided prompt probable cause determinations. 7 s Conversely, "[o]n the
federal stage, Rule 5(a) addresses this concern."' 76 The court went on to apply §
3501's totality of the circumstances test without employing McLaughlin and
found Perez's confession to be voluntarily given and therefore admissible. 77
However, the court did note that five-day delays in bringing defendants before
magistrates were generally impermissible.'78
In Adekunle, the issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether a suspected ali-
mentary canal drug smuggler's 100-hour detention, in advance of being taken to
a magistrate, was unconstitutional.'79 Customs officials detained Kamorudeen
Adekunle ("Adekunle") and a companion at the United States/Mexican border
on the suspicion that the two were smuggling drugs. 8 During their detention
the men were strip-searched and read their Miranda warnings, but not arrested.'
The initial detention occurred on a Saturday, after which Adekunle was taken to
a local hospital and held for two days before officials obtained a court order
from a magistrate requiring Adekunle to submit to an x-ray examination which
169. See id. at 549-50 (Politz, C.J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 550 (Politz, C.J., dissenting).
171. See United States v. Perez-Bustamante, 963 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Adekunle, 980
F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, 2 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1993).
172. Perez-Bustamante, 963 F.2d at 49.
173. See id. at 52.
174. See id. at 53.
175. Id.
176. Id. Was the court suggesting McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding does not apply when the fed-
eral government causes a judicial determination of probable cause to be unreasonably delayed?
177. See id. at 53-54.
178. Id. at 54.
179. See United States v. Adekunle, 980 F.2d 985, 986 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, 2 F.3d 559 (5th
Cir. 1993).
180. Id. at 986-87.
181. Id.
[VOL. 24:73
2005] WEIGHING SOCIETY'S NEED FOR EFFECTIVE LA WENFORCEMENTAGAINSTAN 91
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO LIBERTY- SWINNEY V. STATE AND THE FORTY-EIGHT HOUR RULE
would reveal the presence of any foreign objects in his abdomen.182 The exam
revealed the existence of foreign objects and that evening, when Adekunle began
passing heroin filled balloons, he was formally arrested but held in the hospital
for two more days until all the balloons had been expelled. 83 Adekunle was
then jailed and taken before a magistrate the following morning after a total of
100 hours had passed since his initial detention at the border."
After entering a conditional plea of guilt to drug smuggling Adekunle argued
before the Fifth Circuit that the delay in bringing him before a magistrate was
impermissible, and therefore any statements made during this period of time
were inadmissible.18 The court recognized that unnecessary delay in providing
a probable cause determination after a warrantless arrest could lead to a Fourth
Amendment violation. 88 However, Adekunle's ability to control his bodily
functions, along with the need to monitor him until the heroin was safely
expelled, led the Fifth Circuit to find the delay justified.187
On rehearing before the same panel of the Fifth Circuit, the court reached the
same conclusion, but with a different justification.188 This time the court rea-
soned that McLaughlin's forty-eight hour requirement should not only apply to
probable cause determinations, but also reasonable suspicion evaluations.189
Whether a suspect is detained on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the
same liberty interests are at stake.1"' However, Adekunle's 100-hour detention
was constitutional because a magistrate issued an x-ray order within forty-eight
hours of his initial confinement at the United States border."' This order was an
implicit judicial evaluation of reasonable suspicion that satisfied Adekunle's
constitutional rights and therefore, Adekunle's drug smuggling conviction was
affirmed.192
In West v. Johnson,93 the Fifth Circuit was again faced with the issue of
whether a suspect's statement should be suppressed on the allegation that the
individual's presentment before a magistrate was unreasonably delayed. 94
Robert West, Jr. ("West") was arrested without a warrant on the suspicion of
murder in the early morning hours of August 24, 1982.195 After West was con-
victed and sentenced to death for capital murder he sought habeas corpus relief
182. See id.
183. Id. at 987.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 986, 989.
186. See id. at 989 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44 (1991)).
187. Id.
188. See United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding Adekunle's detention to pass
"constitutional muster").
189. See id. at 561-62.
190. See id. at 561 ('"confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and
impair his family relationships."') (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114).
191. Id. at 562.
192. Id.
193. 92 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1996).
194. See id. at 1400, 1404.
195. See id. at 1390, 1401; West v. State, 720 S.W.2d 511,513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (providing that the
arrest was warrantless).
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in United States District Court.196 Appealing the district court's denial of habeas
corpus relief before the Fifth Circuit, West argued his confession obtained thirty
hours after arrest should have been excluded since his presentment before a
magistrate was unnecessarily delayed.197 In response to this argument the Fifth
Circuit found West's confession admissible since it was obtained within
McLaughlin's forty-eight requirement. 9 The court also noted that even if there
was an unreasonable delay, the Constitution would not be implicated. 99 An
unreasonable delay only prohibits the use of confessions in federal
prosecutions,"' and is only a factor to be considered in determining the volun-
tariness of a confession.0 Since West's confession was voluntarily given his
request for habeas relief was denied.0 2
At the time this Note was written, the most recent Fifth Circuit opinion decid-
ing an alleged McLaughlin violation arose from a twenty-one hour detention.0 3
Jason Mullin ("Mullin") was apprehended by military police at Fort Hood,
Texas after he was observed trying to break into a vehicle. 4 After being
detained twenty-one hours Mullin gave a full confession to the observed break-
in and several other car burglaries that had recently occurred on the base. 5 On
appeal, Mullin claimed the twenty-one hour detention rendered his confession
involuntary.0 6 The Fifth Circuit held that the detention was presumptively rea-
sonable, since it lasted less than forty-eight hours. 7 Also, any delay was caused
by Mullin's lies to authorities concerning his true identity and not by military
police attempting to obtain a confession.2" Consequently, Mullin's confession was
voluntary and his conviction was upheld. 9
E. Mississippi Supreme Court Precedent Applying Gerstein/McLaughlin
An interesting aspect of the Mississippi Supreme Court cases involving
Gerstein/McLaughlin claims is that none of the above provided decisions by the
circuit courts are discussed. Instead, most of these decisions are resolved by
196. See West, 92 F.3d at 1389.
197. See id. at 1389, 1404.
198. See id. at 1404, 1405.
199. Id. at 1404 (citing De La Rosa v. Texas, 743 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1984)). How can this statement
be correct when both Gerstein and McLaughlin announced Fourth Amendment violations of the United States
Constitution arising from delays in judicial determinations of probable cause'? True, in circumstances where an
individual is arrested pursuant to a warrant and then not brought before a magistrate promptly
Gerstein/McLaughlin would not apply since the warrant represents a judicial determination of probable cause.
However, in the case of West who was not arrested pursuant to a warrant, see West, 720 S.W.2d at 513,
McLaughlin's forty-eight hour Fourth Amendment holding would be applicable.
200. See West, 92 F.3d at 1404 (citing Smith v. Heard, 315 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951)).
201. See id. (citing Smith, 315 F.2d at 694) (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)).
202. See id. at 1405, 1411-12.
203. See United States v. Mullin, 178 F.3d 334, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).
204. Id. at 336.
205. See id. at 336, 337.
206. Id. at 342.
207. See id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991)).
208. See id.
209. See id. at 342-43.
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either directly applying McLaughlin's burden-shifting forty-eight hour require-
ment, or by using Mississippi Supreme Court precedent involving alleged viola-
tions of Mississippi's Initial Appearance Rule 6.03.21 In fact, the McLaughlin
question in Swinney was addressed by the court only looking at two prior deci-
sions involving Rule 6.03, and the McLaughlin opinion. " This subsection will
provide Mississippi Supreme Court cases applying McLaughlin and the two
decisions involving Rule 6.03, that the Swinney court found relevant in resolving
the unreasonable delay issue on appeal.
1. Pre-Swinney Opinions Referencing or Applying McLaughlin
The McLaughlin decision was first mentioned by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in two 1991 opinions.2 12 However, neither case provided a substantive
resolution of a McLaughlin Fourth Amendment challenge. In Veal, Dwayne
Veal ("Veal") could not make a McLaughlin claim because he was detained pur-
suant to an arrest warrant. 2 '3 Nonetheless, Veal argued that the delay in provid-
ing him an initial appearance violated Rule 1.04214 and thus made his confession
inadmissible.215  Regarding this claim the supreme court noted that Mississippi
law recognized law enforcement's need to have the ability to conduct investiga-
tions prior to a suspect's initial appearance, and the impracticability of immedi-
ate initial appearances. 218 To support this proposition the court cited McLaughlin
by analogy, but did not provide an explanatory parenthetical.1 7 Ultimately, the
court held that even if the unnecessary delay requirement of Rule 1.04 was vio-
lated, Veal's voluntary and knowing waiver allowed the admission of his confes-
sion into evidence.1 8
In Hansen, the court's reference to McLaughlin arose from Tracy Hansen's
("Hansen") claim that he was prejudiced when a trial court refused to grant him
a preliminary hearing.219 Before finding the circuit court's denial of Hansen's
motion for a preliminary hearing to be harmless error, the court noted that Rule
1.04 required an initial appearance without unreasonable delay and McLaughlin
required an initial appearance within forty-eight hours. 22' The exact time
between Hansen's arrest and initial appearance was not provided in the opinion.
210. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03.
211. See Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1231-32 (Miss. 2002).
212. Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114 (Miss. 1991); Veal v. State, 585 So. 2d 693 (Miss. 1991).
213. See Veal, 585 So. 2d at 694. Cf United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1998)
(noting that the defendant's arraignment was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours; but, since the defendant
was arrested through the use of a warrant McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding was inapplicable);
Lawrence v. State, 869 So. 2d 353, 356 (Miss. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation under
Gerstein/McLaughlin since an arrest warrant was served the day after an arrest, representing a judicial finding
of probable cause).
214. MISS. UNIF. CRiM. R. CIR. CT. PiAC. 1.04 (replaced by Rule 6.03 on May 1, 1995).
215. Veal, 585 So. 2d at 698.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 699.
219. Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 122 (Miss. 1991).
220. Id. at 122 n.1, 123.
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None of Hansen's claims on appeal alleged a specific McLaughlin Fourth
Amendment violation. The court affirmed Hansen's conviction and death sen-
tence for capital murder. 21
In Ormond v. State,"' the issue that gave rise to a McLaughlin reference was
whether the results from a gonorrhea exam, obtained by search warrant, should
have been suppressed as the product of an unlawful search. 2 3  J.C. Ormond
("Ormond") was arrested on March 18, 1988, on the suspicion that he had raped
an eight-year-old child. 224 The following day, while Ormond remained in cus-
tody, a search warrant was executed which required him to submit to a gonor-
rhea exam.225 On March 21, Ormond was afforded his initial appearance.
22
1
After being convicted and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,
Ormond argued before the supreme court that the delay between the time of his
arrest and initial appearance was unreasonable and therefore, the results of the
exam obtained before the initial appearance were inadmissible. 27
In analyzing this claim the court noted that Rule 1.04 required an individual
to be provided an initial appearance without unnecessary delay, and unnecessary
delay was defined as exceeding forty-eight hours."s However, the court's previ-
ous opinion in Veal lead to the ruling that evidence obtained prior to a delayed
initial appearance, and used at trial, would not automatically result in a reversal
of a conviction.229 Moreover, the court found the following facts relevant:
Ormond was read Miranda warnings, he did provide a valid waiver, and the evi-
dence obtained before the initial appearance was objective, unlike a confession
which could be obtained through interrogation. 3 An application of these facts
to the salient law led the supreme court to hold that the trial court did not err
when the results of the gonorrhea exam were allowed in as evidence. 23
1
The first Mississippi Supreme Court opinion in which McLaughlin's forty-
eight requirement was actually applied was decided on December 8, 1994, in
Thorson v. State.232 Approximately forty-seven hours passed from the time
Roger Thorson ("Thorson") was placed under police custody on Saturday,
221. Id. at 122, 154.
222. 599 So. 2d 951 (Miss. 1992).
223. See id. at 955.
224. See id. at 954-55.
225. See id. at 955. The eight-year-old victim had tested positive for gonorrhea prior to Ormond's arrest.
See id. at 954.
226. Id. at 955.
227. Id. at 954, 955.
228. Id. at 955 (citing Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 122 n.1 (Miss. 1991) (citing County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991))).
229. See id. (citing Veal v. State, 585 So. 2d 693, 698-99 (Miss. 1991)).
230. See id. at 955-56.
231. Id. at 958. If Ormond was strictly decided by applying McLaughlin's forty-eight hour requirement
the outcome would be uncertain since the facts presented did not indicate whether Ormond was arrested pur-
suant to an arrest warrant, search warrant, or solely based upon a probable cause determination by law enforce-
ment. However, the search warrant requiring Ormond to submit to a gonorrhea exam was executed the day
after his arrest and in order to administer this exam it is likely that the warrant required Ormond to be in some
form of custody or detention. See id. at 955. Therefore, the warrant would represent a judicial determination
of probable cause to detain Ormond within forty-eight hours of arrest and McLaughlin would likely be satisfied.
232. 653 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1994).
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March 7, until his initial appearance on Monday, March 9.233 However, during
an interrogation on the morning of March 9, approximately forty-one hours after
being placed in custody, Thorson confessed to raping and murdering Gloria
McKinney." On appeal, Thorson argued that his confession should have been
suppressed at trial, since the delay between his arrest and initial appearance vio-
lated Rule 1.04 and his Fourth Amendment rights under Gerstein.235
In response, the court noted that this Fourth Amendment right was addressed
by McLaughlin which regarded probable cause determinations made inside of
forty-eight hours as normally sufficient. 2" Then, the court cited the portion of
McLaughlin which stipulated that Fourth Amendment violations could occur
even if a probable cause determination was made within forty-eight hours if
there existed "'delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify
the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay
for delay's sake."' 237 Thorson's initial appearance was delayed because of a
court administrator's scheduling error and not by law enforcement for the pur-
pose of gathering enough evidence to support Thorson's arrest. 238 Therefore,
Thorson's confession was found to be admissible because it "was not a product
of any delay in taking him before a magistrate." '239 However, Thorson's case
was remanded on an unrelated Batson hearing.240
2. Post-Swinney Opinions Referencing or Applying McLaughlin
Subsequent to Swinney being decided there have been three additional
Mississippi Supreme Court opinions either applying or referencing McLaughlin.
In Jones v. State,24 ' the first decision post-Swinney, the issue giving rise to a
McLaughlin reference was whether a suspect's confession should have been sup-
pressed due to a failure in providing a timely initial appearance.242 Jason Jones
("Jones") was arrested without a warrant in Memphis on January 10, returned to
Mississippi on January 12, and given an initial appearance on January 15.23 On
January 12, after being returned to Mississippi, Jones confessed to murder.2"
On appeal Jones claimed the failure to provide him with an initial appearance
within forty-eight hours of his January 12 arrest violated Mississippi's Initial
Appearance Rule 6.03, and thus rendered his confession inadmissible.24
Two factors led the court to deny Jones's claim and deem his confession
admissible. First, a delay in providing a timely initial appearance, in and of
233. See id. at 881, 883.
234. See id. at 881.
235. Id. at 886.
236. Id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S 44 (1991)).
237. Id. (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-57).
238. See id. at 886.
239. Id. at 887 (citing Veal v. State, 585 So. 2d 693, 699 (Miss. 1991)).
240. Id. at 896.
241. 841 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 2003).
242. See id. at 131-34.
243. Id. at 131-32.
244. Id. at 132.
245. See id. at 131-32.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
itself, was not a sufficient reason to exclude a confession.246 Second, the forty-
eight hour requirement should have begun when Jones was returned to
Mississippi, and not on his initial arrest by Memphis police.247 Consequently,
his confession was obtained well within forty-eight hours of being returned to
Mississippi and before any unnecessary delay. 248 Therefore, Jones did not suffer
any prejudice by his initial appearance being delayed.2 49 McLaughlin was cited
for the proposition that delays in transporting prisoners were reasonable per the
Fourth Amendment.5 0
In Lawrence v. State,25 ' the issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court was
whether Rule 6.03 or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
were violated when six days passed between the time Larry Lawrence
("Lawrence") was arrested without a warrant, and given an initial appearance. 2
The Mississippi Court of Appeals had held that the six-day delay between arrest
and appearance before a judicial officer was an unreasonable seizure and there-
fore, a violation of the Fourth Amendment s.2  However, the supreme court
decided the delay did not give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation because an
arrest warrant was executed one day after Lawrence's initial detention.
2 4
Moreover, just because Rule 6.03 may have been violated did not automatically
result in a Fourth Amendment violation.5 Subsequently, Lawrence's conviction
was affirmed. 6
At the time this Note was written, the most recent Mississippi Supreme Court
opinion referencing McLaughlin arose from a defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim s.2 7  Robert Simon ("Simon") alleged that his counsel at trial
provided ineffective assistance because of the lack of an objection to the admis-
sion of a confession obtained between the time Simon was arrested and brought
246. Id. at 132 (citing Davis v. State, 743 So. 2d 326, 337 (Miss. 1999)).
247. Id. at 133.
248. See id. at 133-34.
249. See id. at 134.
250. Id. at 133. However, the Supreme Court decision would not have been applicable to Jones's claim
since an arrest warrant was provided the night of his initial detention in order for Memphis police to hold him
until sheriff's officers from Washington County could arrive and take him back to Mississippi. See id. at 122;
cf. United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant's arraignment
was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours; but, since the defendant was arrested through the use of a warrant,
McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding was inapplicable); Lawrence v. State, 869 So. 2d 353, 356 (Miss.
2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation under Gerstein/McLaughlin since an arrest warrant was served
the day after an arrest, representing a judicial finding of probable cause).
251. 869 So. 2d 353 (Miss. 2003).
252. See id. at 353.
253. Id. at 354.
254. Id. at 356.
255. See id. at 356. Rule 6.03 requires individuals arrested without warrants to have initial appearances
within forty-eight hours where judicial determinations of probable cause will be made. Id. at 354-55 (citing
Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03). However, the United States Supreme Court has provided that the
Constitution does not require adversarial or specific pretrial procedures for a judicial determination of probable
cause. See id. at 356 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975)). Consequently, a violation of
Rule 6.03 "does not necessarily rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Id.
256. Id.
257. See Simon v. State, 857 So. 2d 668, 688 (Miss. 2003).
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before a judicial officer.258 First, the court noted that under McLaughlin, Simon
had the burden of proving a violation since he was detained for less than forty-
eight hours.21 9 Second, since the delay did not exceed forty-six hours and could
be attributed to bad weather and scheduling conflicts with other defendants,
Simon could not prove that his rights were violated.26 Consequently, Simon's
counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the delay
between Simon's detention and initial appearance.261
3. Opinions Applying Mississippi's Initial Appearance Rule Cited in Swinney
The two opinions besides McLaughlin the Swinney court looked to as being
being salient also included claims in which delayed initial appearances were
alleged to make confessions inadmissible.262 However, neither decision refer-
enced or applied McLaughlin, perhaps because both defendants were initially
detained by arrest warrants, reflecting judicial determinations of probable
cause.263 In Abram, Donald Abram ("Abram") was held for approximately four
days before being given an initial appearance.2" During this period Abram was
consistently interrogated and an initial appearance was only provided immediate-
ly after a confession was obtained, although a judge was at all times available
during Abram's four-day detention.265 Looking to Rule 1.04, the court explained
all arrested individuals had to be taken in front of a judge without unnecessary
delay.266 Furthermore, "without unnecessary delay" had been defined as meaning
"as soon as 'custody, booking, administrative and security needs have been
met."' 267 Otherwise, the absence of access to a judicial officer was the only
allowable excuse for delay.
2 68
Analyzing Abram's arrest and detention the court found his initial appearance
to be delayed for the purpose of obtaining a confession.269 Since this purpose
was not a valid excuse for delay under Rule 1.04 the court found the delayed ini-
tial appearance to be reversible error because it produced an uncounseled confes-
sion, which was the entire basis for Abram's conviction.270 Furthermore, the
unnecessary delay violated Abram's right to counsel and therefore his capital





262. See Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 643 (Miss. 1998); Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015, 1029 (Miss.
1992).
263. See Evans, 725 So. 2d at 643 (explaining how a warrant was issued for Evans's arrest on kidnapping
charges); Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1019 (noting that an arrest warrant was obtained against Abram for capital mur-
der and armed robbery).
264. See Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1029.
265. See id. at 1021-23, 1029.
266. See id. at 1029 (citing Miss. UNIF. CRIM. R. CIR. CT. PRAC. 1.04 (replaced by Rule 6.03 on May 1,
1995)).
267. Id. (quoting Nicholson v. State, 523 So. 2d 68, 76 (Miss. 1988)).
268. Id. (citing Nicholson, 523 So. 2d at 76).
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 1029, 1043.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
On the other hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court found an unnecessary
delay claim to be without merit in Evans.2 The court distinguished Evans from
its prior holding in Abram by explaining that unlike Abram, Donald Evans
("Evans") was advised by counsel before making any incriminating statements
to law enforcement." 3 Also, Evans's conviction was not entirely based on his
confession.7 4 Furthermore, Evans was repeatedly provided with Miranda warn-
ings and had been detained for four days before making any statements.
275
Repeated Miranda warnings and the significant passage of time were two factors
a previous opinion had described as being able to remove the taint from any
unnecessary delay.276 Consequently, the trial court ruling finding Evans's con-
fessions to be admissible was affirmed. 7
In summary, individuals claiming McLaughlin violations in Mississippi
courts have not had a history of success. However, Swinney represented an
opportunity for the Mississippi Supreme Court to reverse this trend. Although
the delay in Swinney occurred within forty-eight hours of arrest, where Swinney
had the burden of proving unreasonableness, the stated purpose for the delay
could easily be considered impermissible under McLaughlin's Fourth
Amendment holding.
IV. INSTANT CASE (Swinney II)
In Swinney's second hearing before the Mississippi Supreme Court the iden-
tical four issues previously decided in the withdrawn opinion were again
addressed: 1) whether Swinney's initial appearance was unreasonably delayed;
2) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain incriminating sections of
Swinney's statements to law enforcement while excluding exculpatory portions;
3) whether the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict to the robbery
charge; and 4) whether the trial court's refusal to provide a circumstantial evi-
dence instruction was erroneous." The second, third, and fourth issues were
analyzed through the same reasoning in the withdrawn opinion and essentially
the same conclusions were reached.
7 9
For instance, the supreme court held that the lower court erred in admitting
incriminating portions of Swinney's statement to police while at the same time
excluding exculpatory sections.280 However, Swinney's failure to show that the
error affected her trial's outcome resulted in the court deeming the error harm-
less.281 Also, Swinney's directed verdict argument was rejected on rehearing
272. Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 644-45 (Miss. 1998).
273. See id. at 644.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. (citing Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 757 (Miss. 1984)).
277. See id. at 645.
278. Compare Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1230, 1235-36 (Miss. 2002), with Swinney v. State, No.
1999-KA-00031-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at **7-8, 19-20, 22, 24 (Miss. March 1, 2001).
279. Compare Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1235-37, with Swinney, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at ** 19-25.
280. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1236.
281. Id.
[VOL. 24:73
2005] WEIGHING SOCIETY'S NEED FOR EFFECTIVE LA WENFORCEMENTAGAINSTAN 99
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO LIBERTY: SWINNEY V. STATE AND THE FORTY-EIGHT HOUR RULE
since there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Swinney guilty of rob-
bery.282 In addition, the court found no error in the trial judge's decision to not
give the jury a circumstantial evidence instruction since direct evidence of the
robbery existed in the form of Swinney's confession.283
Conversely, the court reached a different conclusion on the unreasonable
delay issue, giving rise to a McLaughlin analysis.284 Again, Swinney alleged that
the delay between her arrest and initial appearance was unnecessary and in viola-
tion of Rule 6.03, which required initial appearances inside of "forty-eight hours
and without unnecessary delay.""28 Although Swinney's initial appearance was
held within forty-three hours of arrest on November 19, she alleged the delay
was nonetheless unnecessary because law enforcement was ready, and a circuit
court judge was available for her arraignment on November 18.28 Consequently,
Swinney argued her statements made on the morning of November 19, after the
unreasonable delay and before her initial appearance, were taken in violation of
her federal and state right to counsel and therefore suppression was required.287
Once more in deciding this issue the court relied upon the United States
Supreme Court's decision in McLaughlin and Rule 6.03, which together required
an arrested person to have an initial appearance within forty-eight hours of
arrest, and without unnecessary delay.288 The court further explained
McLaughlin's holding as putting the burden of proof on defendants to show an
improper purpose for a delay, such as a delay for the goal of amassing additional
evidence, when an initial appearance was held within forty-eight hours of
arrest.289 However, when forty-eight hours elapsed the State had the burden of
showing an exigent circumstance for the delay to be considered reasonable.29
Further, the court looked to its own precedent involving alleged violations of
Rule 6.03 where unnecessary delay was defined "to mean 'as soon as custody,
booking, administrative and security needs have been met.""'29 Also, the court
noted that once the administrative needs of law enforcement had been met, the
only excusable reason for delay could be the unavailability of a judge to conduct
an initial appearance.292 Therefore, in Mississippi, even if an initial appearance
was held within forty-eight hours of arrest, it could still be unconstitutional.29 3
Subsequently, the court noted Swinney's initial appearance was delayed
from November 18, to November 19, on request from the District Attorney.294
282. See id.
283. See id. at 1236-37.
284. See id. at 1230-35.
285. See id. at 1230 (citing Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03).
286. See id.
287. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 6).
288. See id. at 1231.
289. See id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991)).
290. See id. (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57).
291. See id. (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 644 (Miss. 1997) (citing Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d
1015 (Miss. 1992))).
292. Id. (citing Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1029).
293. See id. at 1231-32 (citing Evans, 725 So. 2d at 644).
294. Id. at 1232.
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Also, the court explained a judicial officer was available to conduct initial
appearances starting November 17, and continued to be available throughout the
entire week.29 Swinney argued these facts showed her appearance was delayed
for an improper purpose, although the trial court held the delay was justified so
law enforcement could decide whether to bring double murder charges against
Swinney.296
In agreeing with the trial court's conclusion the supreme court noted Rule
1.04, unlike its successor Rule 6.03, did not require a probable cause determina-
tion at an initial hearing.297 Therefore, the court found Abram, in which a viola-
tion of Rule 1.04 caused the court to reverse a conviction, to be distinguishable
from Swinney's case since Rule 6.03 replaced Rule 1.04 before Swinney's
arrest.298 Furthermore, Abram was distinguishable because Abram's initial
appearance was delayed seventy-two hours, while Swinney's was only delayed
forty-three hours."'6
In addition, the court explained that the minor delay Swinney suffered was
reasonable since officers were trying to determine if double murder charges were
appropriate in "an extremely difficult and problematic case."3 ' Therefore, the
court found Swinney's initial appearance to be held within a reasonable amount
of time."' Consequently, Swinney was not automatically entitled to counsel
before her initial appearance on the morning of November 19, when she made
incriminating statements, because the right to counsel attaches at the time an ini-
tial appearance should be held." 2
After determining that Swinney's initial appearance argument would not
lead to suppression, the court sought to determine whether Swinney had invoked
and waived her right to counsel before making incriminating statements. 3 First,
the court determined that Swinney never argued the specific issue of her invok-
ing the right to counsel at trial, and therefore her argument was procedurally
barred. 4 Then the court analyzed the issue despite the procedural bar,30 ' and
found the trial court judge's ruling on admissibility to be a factual finding, which
would not be overturned unless the finding was manifestly incorrect or contrary
to the significant weight of the relevant evidence.0  Also, the court found there
295. Id.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 1231, 1232.




302. See id. (citing Jimpson v. State, 532 So. 2d 985, 988 (Miss. 1988) (quoting May v. State, 524 So. 2d
957, 967 (Miss. 1988))).
303. See id.
304. Id. at 1232-33 (citing Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 631 (Miss. 1997); Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d
829, 845 (Miss. 1994); Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1270 (Miss. 1994); Cole v. State, 525 So. 2d 365, 369
(Miss. 1987); Irving v. State, 498 So. 2d 305 (Miss. 1986); Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196 (Miss. 1985); In re
Hill, 460 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1984); Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427 (Miss. 1983)).
305. See id. at 1233-35.
306. See id. at 1235 (citing Applewhite v. State, 753 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Miss. 2000)).
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was substantial evidence to support the trial court's holding despite the judge's
failure to identify a legal standard or apply a legal analysis." 7 Ultimately, the
court found no error in the trial judge's decision to deny Swinney's motion to
suppress her confession."8
In dissent, Chief Justice Pittman, joined by Justice Graves, disagreed with
the majority's holding on Swinney's waiver of the right to counsel and would
have reversed for a new trial.3 9 Justice Pittman provided that Swinney's right to
counsel argument was not procedurally barred because her motion to suppress
contained sufficient information for the trial court to take notice of this claim
along with the unreasonable delay allegation.3 10 Further, Pittman noted that the
procedural bar was inappropriately applied because the right to counsel is a fun-
damental right,31' and violations of such rights are subject to review under plain
error.312 Thereafter, Justice Pittman found Swinney's right to counsel violated
because she invoked the right and yet, interrogation by a law enforcement officer
continued.3 13 According to the Chief Justice, Swinney's incriminating statement,
made after an invocation of the right to counsel, was inadmissible.314
V. ANALYSIS
The Swinney decision is important for two main points. One, a new excep-
tion to requiring initial appearances without unnecessary delay was created in the
form of determining whether additional charges could be brought against a
defendant.315 Two, the court held that this new exception did not fall under
McLaughlin's prohibition against delays for the purpose of gathering evidence to
justify an arrest. 16 This second point will likely result in virtually all future
McLaughlin claims being denied by Mississippi courts where a delay has not
exceeded forty-eight hours and the burden is on the defendant to prove unreason-
ableness.
Consequently, whether the facts of Swinney even required an application of
McLaughlin will be analyzed. Also, whether the court's application of McLaughlin
was congruent with other courts' decisions involving Gerstein/McLaughlin claims
will be addressed. Moreover, assuming McLaughlin was misapplied and a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred, should the exclusionary rule apply to
confessions made after probable cause determinations have been unreasonably
delayed?
307. See id. at 1235.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 1237-38 (Pittman, C.J., dissenting).
310. See id. (Pittman, C.J., dissenting).
311. See id. (Pittman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Beckum v. State, 786 So. 2d 1060, 1062-63 (Miss. 2001)).
312. See id. (Pittman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Porter v. State, 732 So. 2d 899, 902-05 (Miss. 1999)).
313. See id. at 1237 (Pittman, C.J., dissenting).
314. See id. at 1238 (Pittman, C.J., dissenting).
315. See id. at 1232. Previously, without unnecessary delay was defined as meaning "'as soon as custody,
booking, administrative and security needs have been met."' Swinney v. State, No. 1999-KA-00031-SCT,
2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at *13 (Miss. March 1, 2001), withdrawn and substituted by, 829 So. 2d 1225 (quoting
Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 644 (Miss. 1997)).
316. Id. at 1231-32.
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A. The Facts of Swinney Support an Application of McLaughlin
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein
provided that the Fourth Amendment required judicial findings of probable cause
before arrestees could be subject to extended pretrial detention. 17 This holding
was later clarified in McLaughlin by the addition of a burden-shifting forty-eight
hour rule where a presumption of a Fourth Amendment violation would exist
when an arrestee's judicial determination of probable cause was delayed in
excess of forty-eight hours. 18 However, a Fourth Amendment violation could
still occur if a judicial finding of probable cause was made within forty-eight
hours of arrest if an individual could prove the judicial finding was nonetheless
delayed for an impermissible purpose. 9 Since Gerstein/McLaughlin require
judicial findings of probable cause prior to extended pretrial detention, those per-
sons arrested pursuant to warrants would not have valid claims under those opin-
ions since arrest warrants represent judicial determinations of probable cause. 2
Therefore, if Swinney was arrested pursuant to a warrant, the Mississippi
Supreme Court should not have applied McLaughlin to Swinney's unreasonable
delay claim.
Unfortunately, whether Swinney was arrested through the use of a warrant is
not explicitly provided in the court's opinion. However, two factors point
towards the conclusion that she was arrested through law enforcement's on-the-
scene determination of probable cause rather than a warrant. First, the time
between the commission of the robbery/homicide, Swinney's arrest, and her ini-
tial in custody statement does not support a finding of Swinney being arrested
through the use of a warrant. Swinney initially entered Don's Pawn Shop around
2:15 p.m., and after being arrested at a roadblock she gave an initial statement to
the Captain of the Corinth Police Department at 5:00 p.m. that same afternoon. 2 '
This period between the commission of the crime and Swinney's arrest was
highly unlikely to be long enough for law enforcement to identify her as a sus-
pect and present this information to a judicial officer in order to obtain an arrest
warrant. What likely occurred was that the eyewitnesses identifying a slender
black man and heavier set person leaving the scene of the crime described to law
enforcement the vehicle in which Swinney and her brother made their get-
away. 22 Then, roadblocks were set up to stop any vehicle matching the witness-
es' descriptions, and at one of these roadblocks Swinney and her brother were
stopped and taken into custody. 23
317. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
318. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).
319. See id. at 56.
320. Cf United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant's
arraignment was delayed in excess of forty-eight hours; but, since the defendant was arrested through the use
of a warrant McLaughlin's Fourth Amendment holding was inapplicable); Lawrence v. State, 869 So. 2d 353,
356 (Miss. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation under Gerstein/McLaughlin since an arrest warrant
was served the day after an arrest, representing a judicial finding of probable cause).
321. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1229-30.
322. See id. at 1229.
323. See id.
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The second factor supporting the conclusion that Swinney was taken into
custody through a warrantless arrest comes from the court's discussion of
Mississippi's Initial Appearance Rule 6.03.32" In this context the court was dis-
tinguishing the facts of Swinney's pretrial detention from a previous decision
where a violation of Rule 1.04, the predecessor to Rule 6.03, resulted in a rever-
sal of a defendant's conviction for capital murder. 25 The court explained that
Rule 6.03 now required a judicial officer to make a determination of probable
cause, whereas Rule 1.04 did not combine a suspect's initial appearance with a
probable cause determination. 26 However, Rule 6.03 only requires a judicial
determination of probable cause when there has been a warrantless arrest.327 If
Swinney had been arrested pursuant to a warrant no probable cause determina-
tion would have occurred during her initial appearance. Therefore, in order for
Swinney to be distinguishable from Abram on this point, Swinney must have
been subjected to a warrantless arrest.
Standing alone, neither the time between the commission of the
robbery/homicide and Swinney's arrest, nor the court's distinction of Rule 6.03
from 1.04, may conclusively lead to the determination that Swinney was subject-
ed to a warrantless arrest. However, such a conclusion is assured from viewing
these two factors together, along with the reasonable presumption that the
Mississippi Supreme Court would know McLaughlin applies only to warrantless
arrests.328 Therefore, the facts of Swinney did support an application of
McLaughlin's forty-eight hour rule.
B. The Forty-Three Hour Delay in Swinney's Initial Appearance
was a Violation of the Fourth Amendment
The United States State Supreme Court in McLaughlin held that a Fourth
Amendment violation could occur if a probable cause determination was held
within forty-eight hours of arrest, but nonetheless delayed unreasonably.329
Specific examples of unreasonable delays include "delays for the purpose of
gathering additional evidence to justify [an] arrest, a delay motivated by ill will
against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake." 3 However, when
deciding unreasonable delay claims not exceeding forty-eight hours, where the
burden is on the arrestee to prove unreasonableness, courts should allow for flex-
ibility in recognizing the practical realities causing unavoidable delays."31 Some
of these practical realities include transporting arrestees from and to different
324. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03.
325. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1231, 1232 (citing Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1992)).
326. See id. at 1232.
327. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03 ("If the arrest has been made without a warrant, the judicial officer
shall determine whether there was probable cause for the arrest and note the probable cause determination for
the record.") (emphasis added).
328. Cf Lawrence v. State, 869 So. 2d 353, 356 (Miss. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation
under Gerstein/McLaughlin since an arrest warrant was served the day after an arrest, representing a judicial
finding of probable cause).
329. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
330. Id.
331. See id. at 56-57.
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facilities, the unavailability of magistrates on late-night bookings, or the unavail-
ability of the arresting officer who could be involved in processing other sus-
pects. 32 This portion of McLaughlin was applicable to Swinney's arrest and
detention since she was held forty-three hours before being provided an initial
appearance.333
Besides providing the above-referenced portion of McLaughlin,3 34 the
Mississippi Supreme Court did not seek to determine whether the stated purpose
for delaying Swinney's initial appearance fell into one of McLaughlin's prohibi-
tions or allowances for delays not in excess of forty-eight hours. Instead, the
court distinguished the facts of Swinney's arrest and detention from a prior opin-
ion in which the court reversed a capital murder conviction, and further noted the
delay in Swinney's initial appearance was reasonable given the complexity and
difficulty of her case.3 The justification for delaying Swinney's initial appear-
ance, determining if additional charges could be brought,336 conflicts with the
basic policies behind the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Gerstein
and McLaughlin. Also, an analysis of other precedent involving McLaughlin
claims should have led the court to reject this purpose as a reasonable justifica-
tion for delaying Swinney's initial appearance.
The outcome in Swinney would have been more persuasive if Fifth Circuit or
Mississippi Supreme Court opinions involving actual McLaughlin claims were
applied to the facts of Swinney's arrest and pretrial detention. In fact, Thorson v.
State,337 and West v. Johnson,33 8 were holdings from those courts where
McLaughlin claims arising from delays not exceeding forty-eight hours were
rejected. However, an in-depth analysis of these two cases reveals their inapplic-
ability to Swinney and this may explain why they were not mentioned in the
principal decision.
First, in Thorson, the defendant's independent determination of probable
cause was delayed because of a court administrator's error in scheduling an ini-
tial appearance. 39 This is clearly different from the delay in Swinney which was
intentionally caused by the district attorney's office, for what appeared to be fur-
ther investigation." Second, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Johnson provided
even less of an application of McLaughlin's forty-eight hour rule than the
Swinney decision. The defendant's inability to show that he was denied an initial
appearance within forty-eight hours of arrest was enough for the court to deter-
mine no violation had occurred." 1 The portion of McLaughlin explaining how
Fourth Amendment violations could occur when probable cause determinations
332. See id. at 57.
333. See Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Miss. 2002).
334. Id. at 1231.
335. See id. at 1231, 1232.
336. Id. at 1232.
337. 653 So. 2d 876, 886-87 (Miss. 1995).
338. 92 F.3d 1385, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996).
339. Thorson, 653 So. 2d at 886.
340. See Swinney v. State, No. 1999-KA-00031-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at **12-14 (Miss. March 1,
2001), withdrawn and substituted by, 829 So. 2d 1225.
341. See Johnson, 92 F.3d at 1404.
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were delayed within forty-eight hours of arrest was totally ignored.
Furthermore, the court noted that "'[e]ven assuming that the time gap between
arrest and initial appearance was unreasonable, the claim does not rise to consti-
tutional significance, ' a statement which expressly conflicts with the Supreme
Court's holdings in Gerstein and McLaughlin.3
Johnson and Thorson were the two cases from the Fifth Circuit and
Mississippi Supreme Court with facts most similar to Swinney's arrest and pre-
trial detention. However, neither opinion should determine the outcome of
Swinney for the aforementioned reasons. Therefore, other jurisdictions' holdings
involving McLaughlin claims must be examined in order to determine if the
delay in Swinney was unconstitutional.
The following four United States Circuit Courts of Appeals' decisions best
symbolize the two different approaches other courts have used in applying
McLaughlin to unreasonable delay claims not exceeding forty-eight hours. One
opinion from the Seventh Circuit and an Eighth Circuit decision have found vio-
lations of the Fourth Amendment in this context.' In Willis, the court held that
a probable cause determination delayed for the purpose of investigating separate
crimes was impermissible under McLaughlin." The court reasoned that a delay
for the purpose of investigating a separate crime was substantially analogous to a
delay for the purpose of amassing additional evidence to support an arrest, a pur-
pose explicitly impermissible under McLaughlin." Since both delays allowed
law enforcement to question a defendant in custody without a judicial finding of
probable cause, the delay for the purpose of investigating other crimes was also a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 47 In Davis, the Eighth Circuit found a
delay as minor as two hours to violate the Fourth Amendment when the purpose
for the delay was to investigate other separate crimes." 8 The court reasoned that
although McLaughlin allows for flexibility in analyzing inevitable administrative
delays, where administrative booking proceedings were never initiated, delays
would not be permissible just because they did not exceed forty-eight hours. 9
Conversely, two Seventh Circuit opinions subsequent to Willis have rejected
defendants' McLaughlin claims arising from delays not exceeding forty-eight
hours.5 In Daniels, a forty-hour delay was found not to violate Gerstein!
McLaughlin because a line-up identification obtained approximately twenty-six
hours after an arrest was for the purpose of gathering additional evidence, but not
to justify an arrest.351 The court reasoned that the delay would have violated
342. Id. (quoting De La Rosa v. Texas, 743 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1984)).
343. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
56-57 (1991).
344. See Willis v. City of Chicago, 999 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Davis, 174 F.3d
941, 946 (8th Cir. 1999).
345. Willis, 999 F.2d at 288-89.
346. See id. at 289 (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56).
347. See id.
348. See Davis, 174 F.3d at 945-46.
349. See id.
350. See United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 821 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d
311,314 (7th Cir. 1995).
351. See Daniels, 64 F.3d at 313, 314.
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Gerstein/McLaughlin only if the line-up identification was used to support the
existence of probable cause for Daniel's arrest in an affidavit presented to a judi-
cial officer." 2 In Sholola, the Seventh Circuit also denied a defendant's unrea-
sonable delay claim because evidence obtained to justify the defendant's arrest
was collected immediately at the time Sholola was placed in custody. 3 Any
evidence obtained after Sholola was booked and before his initial appearance
was related to separate crimes, distinct from the one he was suspected of com-
mitting at the time of his arrest. '3 '
There is one major distinction between the way Willis/Davis and
Daniels/Sholola interpreted and applied McLaughlin. The courts in Willis and
Davis looked beyond the exact wording of the Supreme Court's opinion and
sought to execute the policy rationale behind the decision. On the other hand,
the Seventh Circuit in Daniels and Sholola narrowly interpreted the language in
McLaughlin in furtherance of other policy justifications. For the following the
reasons, the Willis/Davis approach is the appropriate method and the Mississippi
Supreme Court should have used that analysis to find a violation of Swinney's
Fourth Amendment rights.
One, the Supreme Court in McLaughlin did not provide an exclusive set of
circumstances in which delays less than forty-eight hours could be considered
unreasonable.5 Instead, the Court merely provided "examples" of delays that
would violate the Fourth Amendment.356 Also, the Court provided several exam-
ples of unavoidable delays that should lead courts to find against individuals
making Gerstein claims. 7 A common theme running through the examples of
permissible delays is allowing for circumstances beyond law enforcement's con-
trol, such as the unavailability of a judicial officer." However, there is no com-
mon rationale shared among the examples of impermissible delays. 9 This is
made clear by comparing two of these examples: "delay for delay's sake," and
delay "for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify [an] arrest.""36
Consequently, if an individual can show that their judicial determination of prob-
able cause was intentionally delayed for a purpose not relating to circumstances
beyond law enforcement's control, a Fourth Amendment violation should be
declared.
This conclusion is congruent with the second reason for favoring the
Willis/Davis approach of applying McLaughlin over the Daniels/Sholola method.
Namely, the policies behind the Supreme Court's decisions in Gerstein and
McLaughlin, are better furthered by such a holding. Obviously, in order to justi-
fy this statement these policies must be identified.
352. Seeid. at314.
353. See Sholola, 124 F.3d at 819-20.
354. See id. at 820.
355. Cf County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,56 (1991).
356. See id.
357. See id. at 56-57.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 56.
360. See id.
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Consequently, in Gerstein the Supreme Court sought to balance a state's need
to limit crime with the rights of citizens to liberty." 1 The needs of law enforce-
ment in preventing escapes and limiting an individual's ability to commit further
crimes were said to evaporate once a suspect arrested without a warrant was
taken into custody. 62 Conversely, the right of a citizen to an independent finding
of probable cause was said to significantly increase once a warrantless arrest had
occurred. 63 An individual's financial and familial relations could be severely
damaged by prolonged detention." In supplying a ruling to balance these com-
peting interests the Court held the Fourth Amendment required judicial findings
of probable cause prior to extended restraints of liberty. 6
The Daniels/Sholola method does not further the above cited policy because
using such an approach shifts the balance in favor of law enforcement too far,
which naturally results in a sacrifice of individual liberty. This gives law
enforcement too much latitude and allows them to take statements from
detainees, determine the truthfulness of those statements through investigation,
and subsequently confront those accused with any inconsistencies in their state-
ments.366 Any confessions obtained from this practice would certainly be pre-
sented to a judicial officer making a probable cause determination, and a judge
would be hard pressed to release a suspect for a lack of probable cause when a
confession had been obtained. Also, such an approach does not take into
account the coercive effect being in jail can have on most individuals; especially,
presumptively innocent persons who have not been provided with an indepen-
dent determination of probable cause in the form of a warrant prior to arrest.
Conversely, applying a Willis/Davis approach to unreasonable delay claims
not exceeding forty-eight hours would further the balance between individual
liberty and states' needs for effective law enforcement that Gerstein sought to
achieve. For instance, law enforcement could still investigate and question an
individual subject to a warrantless arrest. These actions would be permissible as
long as the administrative and booking needs of law enforcement had been met
and some action was taken to ensure that a judicial determination of probable
cause was forthcoming.
When this balance seeking approach of applying Gerstein/McLaughlin is
applied to the facts of Swinney's arrest and pretrial detention the justification for
her delayed initial appearance cannot be deemed reasonable. Swinney's initial
appearance was originally set for Tuesday, November 18, but later moved to
November 19, due to a request from the district attorney's office. 67 After this
purposeful delay and before Swinney's initial appearance an investigator from
361. See id. at 52-53 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-14, 125 (1975)).
362. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
363. See id.
364. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114).
365. See id. (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125).
366. Cf Swinney v. State, No. 1999-KA-00031-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at *13 (Miss. March 1,
2001), withdrawn and substituted by, 829 So. 2d 1225.
367. Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1232 (Miss. 2002).
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the district attorney's office confronted Swinney with evidence gathered at the
crime scene that conflicted with her initial statements made to law enforce-
ment. 8 During this questioning Swinney admitted to accidentally shooting Don
Harville in the back, which constituted the only direct proof of her killing the
shop owner."9 The purpose for this delay was characterized as being "necessary
to determine whether double murder charges should be brought against
Swinney."370
How this justification springs forth from the set of facts leading to
Swinney's confession is not entirely clear; but, regardless of the characterization,
Swinney's rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated. The delay was
clearly not for a purpose beyond law enforcement's control." 1 A circuit court
judge was available, and the booking, custody, and security needs of law
enforcement had been met on November 1 8." Also, further evidence was gath-
ered after the delay, resulting in a confession which could hardly be viewed as
not justifying an arrest. 33 Allowing law enforcement to engage in these types of
practices produces a substantial cost. Namely, the deprivation of presumptively
innocent individuals' rights to be free from unreasonable seizures as required by
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
3 7 4
C. A Gerstein/McLaughlin Fourth Amendment Violation Supports an
Application of the Exclusionary Rule
As previously noted, in Powell v. Nevada the United States Supreme Court
decided to leave unresolved the question of whether suppression of evidence is
the appropriate remedy for a Gerstein/McLaughlin Fourth Amendment
violation. 7 ' Also, Gerstein and McLaughlin did not address this issue since both
actions were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and were not appeals from crimi-
nal convictions.' However, the failure to provide a judicial determination of
probable cause in a timely manner is a Fourth Amendment violation,377 and the
368. See Swinney, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at **13-14.
369. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232.
370. Id.
371. An argument could be made that law enforcement had nothing to do with delaying Swinney's initial
appearance, since the district attorney's office was responsible for her arraignment being postponed. See id.
However, in the circumstances of this case the district attorney's office was performing the same functions as
law enforcement by attempting to implicate Swinney in Harville's death through the questioning of
Investigator Dance. See id. Furthermore, in explaining why judicial officers and not prosecutors can make
probable cause determinations for the issuance of warrants, the United States Supreme Court has noted the
responsibility a prosecutor has towards law enforcement is not consistent with that of a detached and neutral
magistrate. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117-118 (1975) (citing Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S.
345 (1972); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)). Therefore, in the context
of Swinney the term "law enforcement" includes the district attorney's office.
372. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232.
373. See id.
374. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
375. See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1994).
376. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 107 n.5.
377. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55-56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
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Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained through such violations is inad-
missible." 8
Moreover, several courts have decided that suppression is the appropriate
remedy when evidence is produced from a judicial determination of probable
cause being unreasonably delayed. 7 9 Also, a Rutgers University Associate
Professor of Law has argued in favor of using the exclusionary rule in this con-
text."' On the other hand, the First and Sixth Circuits have left the remedy issue
unresolved after finding McLaughlin violations, but denying suppression due to
incriminating evidence having been obtained before any unreasonable delays.8 '
Although applying Fifth Circuit or Mississippi Supreme Court precedent to this
issue would be preferable, such an application is impossible since neither court
has found a McLaughlin violation in the context of a criminal appeal as of the
date this Note was written.
Since the only direct evidence of Swinney shooting Don Harville was
obtained after her initial appearance was unreasonably delayed, 83 Fullerton and
Forde would be inapplicable in determining whether suppression was required in
Swinney. Therefore, a determination will be made as to whether applying the
exclusionary rule to Swinney's incriminating statement would serve the rule's
main purpose-deterring misconduct on the part of law enforcement. 83 In addi-
tion, if the exclusionary rule is found to applicable, the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" test shall be applied in order to determine if there was a sufficient causal
connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and Swinney's
confession."
378. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
379. See Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that evidence obtained
through a McLaughlin violation should be excluded if it could be considered fruit from a poisonous tree);
United States v. Leal, 876 F. Supp. 190, 194-95 (C.D. I11. 1995) (finding suppression of a detainee's statement
to be the appropriate remedy for a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation); United States v. Onyema, 766 F. Supp. 76,
82-83, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (excluding evidence obtained through a seventy-eight hour delay, which the court
found to violate the Fourth Amendment as applied by Gerstein/McLaughlin); cf Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d
695, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting in dictum that the suppression of statements obtained during delays in pro-
viding probable cause determinations was the usual remedy for Gerstein/McLaughlin violations in criminal
cases).
380. George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413, 461 (1986)
(arguing for application of the exclusionary rule when Gerstein is violated either through law enforcement's
failure to bring an arrestee before a judge, or when a judicial officer fails to make a determination of probable
cause).
381. See United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting exclusion of incriminating
evidence as a remedy when a McLaughlin violation occurs after evidence is secured); United States v. Forde,
No. 93-1322, 30 F.3d 127, 1994 WL 390143, at *3 (1st Cir. June 30, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (hold-
ing that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred; but, the evidence was obtained before any unreasonable
seizure and therefore the violation could not retroactively void the prior legal search) (citing United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
382. See Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1232 (Miss. 2002).
383. See, e.g., New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990) (justifying not excluding a confession by
explaining how the deterrent effect of such a holding would be minimal); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
918-19 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule "should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law
enforcement activity."); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975) (noting the application of the exclusionary
rule served the dual purposes of deterring lawless conduct and promoting judicial integrity) (citing Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)).
384. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 601-05 (applying Wong Sun's "fruit of the poisonous tree" test).
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Application of the exclusionary rule in Swinney would serve to deter miscon-
duct by the district attorney's office, which intentionally delayed Swinney's ini-
tial appearance and then sought to obtain additional evidence through the
delay." ' This misconduct could not fall into Leon's "good faith exception,
386
because the conduct by the district attorney's office was willful and not objec-
tively reasonable in the light of existing federal and state law. As previously
noted, Swinney's initial appearance was intentionally delayed for a purpose
unrelated to meeting the booking, security, custody, and administrative needs of
law enforcement. 8 Therefore, the delay was willful.
Also, this delay occurred in 1997,388 a full twenty-two years after the
Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein and six years after McLaughlin, in which
the Court held that unreasonable delays could lead to Fourth Amendment viola-
tions." 9 Furthermore, at the time Swinney's initial appearance was postponed,
the Mississippi Supreme Court had held that delays unrelated to booking, securi-
ty, custody, or administrative needs could be unconstitutional.8 Surely, a dis-
trict attorney's office would be aware of this prevailing case law. Consequently,
the action taken to delay Swinney's independent determination of probable cause
could in no way be characterized as objectively reasonable. 91
Ultimately, choosing not to deter this type of misconduct will have a grave
effect. Namely, law enforcement will be able to take people into custody with-
out warrants and investigate those individuals for up to forty-eight hours while
justifying any delay with a carefully worded explanation that does not fall within
one of McLaughlin's specific prohibitions. Such detention for investigation has
long been held improper by the Supreme Court. 92
Thus, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" test will be applied to Swinney's
statements made after her initial appearance was unreasonably delayed. 93 The
Supreme Court has provided four factors to guide courts in making such determi-
nations: "(1) the presence or absence of Miranda warnings; (2) the temporal
proximity of the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening cir-
cumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." '394
385. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232; supra notes 366-69, and accompanying text.
386. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19, 920.
387. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232; supra notes 371-72, and accompany text.
388. Id.
389. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
56-57 (1991).
390. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1231-32 (citing Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 644 (Miss. 1997)).
391. An argument could be made for applying the Supreme Court's holding in New York v. Harris, where
the Court declined to use the exclusionary rule to suppress a defendant's statements made after an illegal arrest.
See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990). In fact, Justice Thomas's dissent in Powell, relied extensively
on Harris for his conclusion that suppression was not an appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation. See
Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 89-92 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, while not resolving the
appropriate remedy issue the majority did characterize the constitutional violations in Harris and McLaughlin,
as being distinguishable. Powell, 511 U.S. at 85 n.*. As a result, Harris should not be relied on for admitting
evidence produced by a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation.
392. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 68 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120 n.21 (cit-
ing Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957)).
393. Cf Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-05 (1975) (applying Wong Sun's "fruit of the poisonous
tree" test).
394. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1072 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
603-04 (1975)).
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Before making incriminating statements to Investigator Dance, Swinney signed a
waiver of rights."' Uncontroverted evidence was presented at trial that showed
Swinney was literate and that the waiver contained information advising
Swinney of "her right to remain silent and have a lawyer present during ques-
tioning."39 Therefore, the first factor in the poisonous tree test weighs in favor
of admitting Swinney's confession. But, this factor is in no way conclusive, and
the other three factors must be examined since Miranda warnings only inform
suspects of their Fifth Amendment rights and not their Fourth Amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable seizures.397
Applying the temporal factor to a Gerstein violation should almost always
point towards exclusion.398 This result occurs because the focus is not on the
time between illegal arrest and confession, but rather between illegal custody and
confession.3 99 For instance, while the passage of time in the case of an illegal
arrest helps dissipate the effect of a Fourth Amendment violation, the same pas-
sage has the opposite effect in cases of illegal detentions."' As time goes by the
pressure on an incarcerated individual to confess increases, while the govern-
ment is given more opportunities to exploit the illegal detention. 1
There is no reason to find in favor of admission when applying this factor to
Swinney's pretrial detention. Because her initial appearance was purposefully
delayed Swinney had to spend an extra night in jail without having an indepen-
dent determination of probable cause.0 2 This extra time was used by law
enforcement to obtain a confession which certainly supported Swinney's
arrest.0 3 As a result, the second poisonous tree factor supports exclusion.
Likewise, the intervening circumstances factor favors suppression when
applied to Swinney. From the time Swinney was initially detained on November
17, until she provided incriminating statements on the morning of November 19,
no sufficiently intervening circumstance occurred.0 4 Unlike the Supreme
Court's ruling in Wong Sun, where the Court found a defendant's incriminating
statement to be free of any poisonous taint due to several days of freedom
between illegal arrest and confession,4 5 there was no causal break between viola-
tion and confession in Swinney. The custody in Swinney was the cause of the vio-
lation, and since the custody continued up until Swinney gave a confession,0 6 her
statements could be considered "fruit from a poisonous tree."
395. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1234.
396. See id.
397. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 601 n.6, 601-02.
398. See Thomas, supra note 380, at 460.
399. See id. at 458-59.
400. See id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 604).
401. See id. at 459 (citing I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.4(a), at 744
(1984); Gloria J. Studdard, Recent Decision, 25 EMORY L.J. 227, 241 (1976)).
402. See Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225, 1232 (Miss. 2002); supra text and accompanying notes 321-
27.
403. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232.
404. See id. at 1230.
405. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
406. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1230.
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A consideration of the last poisonous tree factor, the flagrancy and purpose
of the violation, also points towards Swinney's confession being tainted. Again,
Swinney's initial appearance was originally set for Tuesday afternoon, but post-
poned until Wednesday per the district attorney's office." 7 A judge was available
for the initial appearance on Tuesday, showing that the booking, custody, securi-
ty, and administrative needs of law enforcement had been met.4"8 Investigator
Dance, employed by the district attorney's office, ' 9 questioned Swinney
Wednesday morning in order to present her with evidence which contradicted
her initial statements.410 Then, Swinney confessed to shooting Harville.41 1
Although the delay was described as being justified in order for officers to
determine whether to charge Swinney with double murder,4"2 the facts listed
above do not support such a conclusion. Instead, Swinney's initial appearance
and independent probable cause determination appear to have been delayed for
investigation. Again, detention for investigation has long been held flagrant by
the United States Supreme Court. 41 3 Therefore, the fourth poisonous tree factor
supports exclusion.
As a result, only one factor supports admission, while three support exclu-
sion. Taken as a whole, Swinney's confession has not fallen far enough away
from the poisonous tree to be considered untainted. Since the only direct proof
of Swinney shooting Harville came from her confession,4 4 her conviction should
have been reversed and a new trial ordered.4 1 Such a finding does not come
lightly. If Swinney had been granted a new trial without the admission of her
confession into evidence a guilty person might have gone free.41 6 However, to
hold otherwise would be to sanction an intentional violation of the Constitution
that affects those individuals the Fourth Amendment was most designed to pro-
tect, the presumptively innocent.417
407. Id. at 1232.
408. See id.
409. Id.
410. See Swinney v. State, No. 1999-KA-00031-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 45, at *14 (Miss. March 1,
2001), withdrawn and substituted by, 829 So. 2d 1225.
411. Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232.
412. Id.
413. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 70 n.3 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 n.21 (1975) (citing Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,456 (1957))).
414. SeeSwinney, 829 So. 2dat 1232.
415. Cf Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015, 1029 (Miss. 1992) (finding the failure to provide a timely initial
appearance to be reversible error when the delay resulted in a confession that was the entire basis for a convic-
tion).
416. However, even this result is not assured since Swinney's initial statements to law enforcement, made
before her initial appearance was delayed, put her at the scene of the crime with her brother Nicholas. See
Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1230. These statements could not be excluded as the fruit from a poisonous tree and
they alone may have been enough to find her guilty of capital murder as an accomplice.
417. Cf McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority's choice of a
forty-eight hour rule instead of a stricter twenty-four hour rule undermined the Fourth Amendment and its
common-law bases because presumptively innocent persons could be forced to wait in jail for two full days
without the benefit of any prompt, independent determination of probable cause).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Mississippi Supreme Court's holding in Swinney, that a forty-three hour
detention before an initial appearance was not an unreasonable delay," 8 will like-
ly prevent the success of any Fourth Amendment Gerstein/McLaughlin claim in
Mississippi where an independent determination of probable cause has been
delayed within forty-eight hours of arrest. Post Swinney, any delay will be per-
missible as long as law enforcement can characterize the delay's justification as
not falling into one of McLaughlin's specific prohibitions. Also, an individual's
right to an initial appearance without unnecessary delay under Mississippi's
Initial Appearance Rule 6.03,1 has been severely negated. Previously, under
Rule 6.03 delays were allowed only for administrative, security, booking, and
custody needs,42 or for the lack of a judicial officer to conduct an initial appear-
ance.42" ' Now, the easily manipulated, "determining if additional charges can be
brought," '422 has been added as a permissible justification for delay.
Some may welcome this expansion of the government's ability to investigate
crime. However, McLaughlin and Gerstein sought to achieve a balance between
society's need for effective law enforcement and an individual's right to liberty,
by respectively defining and placing a promptness requirement on judicial deter-
minations of probable cause. 23 The Swinney decision upsets this balance by
approving the delay of an initial appearance, and consequently a judicial finding
of probable cause,424 for the purpose of investigation.42 The McLaughlin Court
explained that delays for the purpose of further investigation were unreason-
able,426 and the Gerstein Court noted probable cause was to be developed prior to
arrest and not through an interrogation process.427 Encouraging the detention of
the presumptively innocent without an independent determination of probable
cause, while evidence is gathered to support the detention, is a procedure which
should not be tolerated in a country founded upon liberty and freedom. This
practice reduces the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
seizures to mere words,4 28 and upsets the delicate balance Gerstein and
McLaughlin sought to achieve between the government's need to limit crime
with the rights of its citizens to liberty.
418. SeeSwinney, 829 So. 2dat 1232.
419. Miss. R. UNIF. CIR. CTY. CT. 6.03.
420. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1231 (citing Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 644 (Miss. 1997) (citing
Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1992))).
421. See id. (citing Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1029).
422. See id. at 1232.
423. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
114, 126 (1975).
424. See supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
425. See Swinney, 829 So. 2d at 1232.
426. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
427. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120 n.21 (citing Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957)).
428. Cf Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (noting how the Fourth Amendment would have no
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